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I. INTRODUCTION
The court,1 readers, and authors must be aware of the contemporary
reality that the United States Courts of Appeals sit in most cases both as the
* This article is adapted from a chapter written by Professor Baker in The First
Decade: The U.S. Courl of Appeals fOr the Eleventh Circuit, 1981-1991, which was
coauthored by J. Ralph Beaird and Sharon Kennedy. .
** Alvin R Allison Professor, Texas Tech University School ofLaw. B.S., cum laude,
Florida State University, 1974; J.D. with high honors, University ofFlorida, 1977. Professor
Baker is also the author of RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL-THE PROBLEMS OF 1HE U.S.
COURTS OF APPEALS (1994). Professor Baker would like to thank U.S. Circuit Judges John
C. Godbold and James C. Hill for their helpful comments and suggestions. He is also
grateful for the support and encouragement of coauthors Beaird and Kennedy, as well as the
able research assistance of·Diana Nichols and Michael S. Truesdale.
1. The generic reference "the court" will be used throughout this chapter. "The court"
is the appropriate reference both to an entire court of appeals and to a particular division or
panel. See Western Pac. RR Corp. v. Western Pac. R.R., 345 U.S. 247, 250, cert. denied
sub nom. Metzger v. Western Pac. R.R., 346 U.S. 910 (1953). When relevant, the distinction
will be made explicit between a three-judge panel and an en bane court.
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appeal of right and as the final court of review. Justice Byron White made
the point:
The Supreme Court of the United States reviews only a small percent-
age of all judgments issued by the twelve courts of appeals. Each of
the courts of appeals, therefore, is for all practical purposes the final
expositor of the federal law within its geographical jurisdiction. This
crucial fact makes each of those courts a tremendously important
influence in the development of the federal law, both constitutional and
statutory. Hence, it is an obviously useful and significant service to
keep close track of and to publicize, particularly for the benefit of
lawyers and judges, the work of the circuits.2
Thus, the decisions of the courts of appeals have become, if not less fallible,
more final in all areas of federal law.3 The Eleventh Circuit's decisions,
like the decisions of the other courts of appeals, have great effects on the
legal life of our Nation. Consequently, the commentator's task becomes
more important.
Likewise, the task of commentary is difficult. The period covered
here-the first decade of the Eleventh Circuit-represents, quite literally and
figuratively, the formative era of the court. Indeed, the volume of decisions
and their variety are qualities that ought to humble, if not intimidate, most
commentators. Justice Holmes once observed that a common law court
could be expected to replicate the entire corpus juris in the space of a single
generation.4 The Eleventh Circuit did this consciously between 1981 and
1991. In Bonner v. City ofPrichard,s the inaugural en bane court held that
the new court-just cleaved from the former Fifth Circuit-would deem
itself bound by the precedents of the old court.6 Of course, any transfused
2. Byron R. White, Dedication, 15 TEX. TECH L. REv. ix, ix (1984) (footnote omitted);
see also THOMAS E. BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL-THE PROBLEMS OF TIlE U.S.
COURTS OF APPEALS 21-27 (1994).
3. Cf Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("We are not
final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final.").
4. Oliver W. Holmes, The Path ofthe Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457 (1897).
The reports of a given jurisdiction in the course of a generation take up pretty
much the whole body of the law, and restate it from the present point of view.
We could reconstruct the corpus from them if all that went before were burned.
The use of the earlier reports is mainly historical ....
[d. at 458.
5. 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (lIth Cir. 1981) (en banc).
6. Id. at 1207. See generally BAKER, supra note 2, at 52-73. For a detailed elaboration
of the legislative and political history of the statute creating the Eleventh Circuit and the
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precedent of the Fifth Circuit or any subsequent decision of the new
Eleventh Circuit is subject to reconsideration by the en banc court.
A second reason for the difficulty in developing commentary on the
Eleventh Circuit is the large volume of the court's decisions. One is
reminded of Douglas Freeman's famous entreaty that a historian-presum-
ably even lawyer/amateur court historians-"should never undertake to
report the thinking of his subjects without written evidence or reliable
autoptic proof."7 The problem facing the court historian, however, is the
sheer volume of the writings that describe the thinking of the circuit judges
as they go about deciding so many appeals. In the first decade of the
Eleventh Circuit, Federal Reporter, Second Series increased by almost 300
volumes, from 661 to 950 volumes. This is the principal resource for the
stoty of the Eleventh Circuit's first decade.s The statistics have an almost
astronomical order of magnitude to them. Although too much is too often
made of the "crisis of volume" in the United States Courts of Appeals,9 a
decade worth of comparison is instructive for present purposes. 10 Let us
compare these standard quantitative measures: the gross number of appeals
filed; appeals filed per three-judge panel; appeals terminated; terminations
per panel; and pending backlog of appeals.
In its first year, the 1981 court year, with twelve active judges,
Eleventh Circuit figures were: appeals filed-2,433; appeals filed per
policy issues of precedent in the new court, see generally Thomas E. Baker, A Legislative
History ofthe Creation ofthe Eleventh Circuit, 8 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 363 (1992); Thomas
E. Baker, A Postscript on Precedent in the Divided Fifth Circuit, 36 Sw. LJ. 725 (1982);
Thomas E. Baker, PrecedentTimes Three: Stare Decisis in the Divided Fifth Circuit, 35 Sw.
LJ. 687 (1981); Thomas E. Baker, A Primer on Precedent in the Eleventh Circuit, 34
MERCER L. REv. 1175 (1983).
The various configurations between the former Fifth Circuit and the new Eleventh
Circuit are no longer relevant, except in one regard. The Supreme Court grants writs of
certiorari to Unit B of the former Fifth Circuit, the administrative unit which corresponded
to the new Eleventh Circuit Both are included in this discussion.
7. STEPHEN B. PRESSER, STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF
THE THIRD CIRCUIT at viii (1981).
8. See HARVEY C. COUCH, A HISTORY OF THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 1891-1981, at v (1984);
see also Thomas E. Baker, Judges. Heal Thyselves: The Dawn ofthe Third Millennium of
F.3d, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 7, 1994, at 30.
9. See BAKER, supranote 2, at 31-52; seealso REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY
COMMITTEE 109 (Apr. 2, 1990).
10. See John C. Godbold, The Eleventh Circuit Court ofAppeals-TheFirst Ten Years,
43 MERCER L. REv. 961, 972 (1992).
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panel-608; appeals terminated-2,191; terminations per panel-548;
and pending cases-2,261.
The statistics for 1991, ten years later, still with twelve judges
authorized, are sobering: appeals filed-4,436 (up 82%); appeals filed
per panel-l,109 (up 82%); appeals terminated-4,107 (up 87%);
terminations per panel-l,027 (up 87%); and pending cases-4,171 (up
84%).11
The docket of the Eleventh Circuit is large compared to most other regional
courts of appeals. In 1991, the Eleventh Circuit ranked third in appeals
filed and terminated and second in cases pending. 12 The Eleventh Circuit
handles approximately ten percent ofall the federal appeals filed nationwide.
Only the undivided Ninth Circuit and the new Fifth Circuit have larger
dockets, and both of those courts have many more judgeships than the
Eleventh Circuit.
The geography and demography of the Eleventh Circuit are unique and
difficult to capture in a two dimensional account. Already, in its first
decade, the new Eleventh Circuit has developed its own legal culture, a
complex of people and places, representative of the legal issues of the day
and inclusive of those perennial questions of federal court jurisdiction that
have defined the republic. To select the "leading cases" is at once very
difficult and highly arbitrary. No doubt many important decisions are left
out of this account. Certainly, other chroniclers would choose differently.
There are as many methodologies of court history as there are historians of
courts. 13
As a practical matter, it would be impossible to conduct an in-depth
review of all the decisions made by the Eleventh Circuit during the court's
first decade. 14 The Mercer Law Review, however, does perform that task
in an annual symposium. The eleven issues covering the relevant period
total over 3500 pages of analysis by more than ninety professional authors
who are experts in their fields. The approach taken in this article is more
selective; it ventures into, at least, some preliminary impressions about the
contributions of the Eleventh Circuit bench to the national law. The focus
11. Id
12. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF mE UNITED STATES COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL
WORKLOAD STATISTICS, Table B, at 19 (Dec. 31, 1991).
13. See, e.g., HISTORY OF mE EIGHm CIRCUIT (1977); HISTORY OF mE SIxm CIRCUIT
(1976). See generally Helen B. Nies, Celebrating the Tenth Anniversaryofthe United States
Court ofAppeals for the Federal Circuit, 14 GEO. MASON U. L. REv. 505 (1992).
14. RAYMAN L. SOLOMON, HISTORY OF mE SEVENm CIRCUIT 1891-1941, at 185
(1976).
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here is on the cases decided by the Supreme Court from 1981 to 1991 which
arose in the Eleventh Circuit. Only the Supreme Court has a national
perspective on the federal law. The perspective from the Supreme Court
thus provides some basis for identifying important cases and for venturing
first decade impressions on the Eleventh Circuit.
While the vantage of this article is from the United States Reports, it
bears emphasis that the purpose of this article is to begin to understand how
the Eleventh Circuit's decisions have contributed to the national law. While
there are many more assessments of the Supreme Court than there are
writings about the United States Courts of Appeals, IS an effort was made
to sample the secondary literature on the intermediate court as well. The
substantive discussion and citations here reflect the careful reporting and
analysis provided during the surveyed period by the seventeen law reviews
in the three states of the Eleventh Circuit.16
It also should be made explicit that the high reversal rate of the
surveyed decisions does not reflect poorly on the Eleventh Circuit. The
"decided propensity" of the Supreme Court, statistically speaking, is to grant
a writ of certiorari in cases it intends to reverse.17 The Eleventh Circuit's
experience in this regard is consistent with the treatment afforded to all the
other courts of appeals. IS Often, the Supreme Court is called on to pick
and choose between conflicting approaches taken by different courts of
appeals, to resolve intercircuit conflicts. In these cases, the opinions in
conflict-both the one preferred and the one rejected-contribute to the High
Court's analysis. Whether the Supreme Court eventually agrees or disagrees
with the Eleventh Circuit, therefore, is not as important as an appreciation
15. But see generally J. WOODFORD HOWARD, JR., COURTS OF APPEALS IN TIIE
FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM: A STUDY OF TIIE SECOND, FIFTII, AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CIRCUITS (1981); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRlSIS AND REFORM (1985).
16. Alabama: Alabama Law Review, Cumberland Law Review. Florida: Florida
Journal of International Law, Florida Law Review, Florida State University Law Review,
Nova Law Review, Stetson Law Review, University of Florida Journal of Law & Public
Policy, University ofFlorida Law Review, University ofMiami Entertainment & Sports Law
Review, University ofMiami Inter-American Law Review, University ofMiami Law Review.
Georgia: Emory International Law Review, Emory Law Journal, Georgia Law Review,
Georgia State Law Review, Mercer Law Review.
17. But see Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, Rehnquist Court Disposition ofLower
Court Decisions: Affirmation Not Reversal, 74 JUDICATURE 84 (1990).
18. See Harold J. Spaeth, Supreme Court Disposition ofFederalCircuit Court Decisions,
68 JUDICATURE 245 (1984); Gerald F. Uelmen, The Influence ofthe Solicitor General upon
Supreme Court Disposition ofFederal Circuit Court Decisions: A Closer Look at the Ninth
Circuit Record, 69 JUDICATURE 361 (1986).
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for the contribution by the Eleventh Circuit to the Supreme Court's
decisions. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
plays the important role of error correction and law development in every
appeal decided. 19 The Supreme Court could not perform its essential role
otherwise.
II. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT
This article is a juridical account of the first decade of a court, and for
the reasons just described, the discussion centers on the most visible
evidence of the intermediate court: appellate decisions. There admittedly
is much missing from this account. It is appropriate to spend at least a few
paragraphs, before proceeding with the case commentary, to highlight what
has happened in the Eleventh Circuit that does not appear in the pages of
Federal Reporter, Second Series. Fortunately, that account has already been
written by John C. Godbold, Senior Circuit Judge. His account may be
relied on for background and context.20
Judge Godbold is the only person to have ever served as chief judge of
two regional courts of appeals (the old Fifth Circuit, at the time of division,
and the new Eleventh Circuit).21 He was thus a witness to this history. In
his recommended article, Judge Godbold describes many of the behind-the-
scenes events of establishing a new court of appeals: renovating the Elbert
P. Tuttle Courthouse in Atlanta; building up a library; hiring support staff;
organizing a clerk's office; recruiting staff attorneys; establishing the
Historical Society; continuing the federal judicial tradition of public service;
and performing other tasks essential to the smooth operation of the
institution.
Judge Godbold's extracurricular history identifies how some early
traditions have already formed in the Eleventh Circuit. Following its parent
circuit, the court of appeals has consciously "chose[n] to be not a mere
recipient of documents but a proactive participant in assuring the prompt
and orderly progress of appeals."22 Its local rules and internal operating
procedures are designed with this goal in mind. Personnel in the clerk's
office and staff attorneys share the judges' commitment to differentiated
case management. Improving relations between the state and federal courts
19. See White, supra note 2, at x; see also BAKER, supra note 2, at 17-21.
20. See Godbold, supra note 10.
21. Harvey Couch, A BriefHistory of the Fifth Circuit Court ofAppeals, 56 TuL. L.
REv. 948, 958 (1982).
22. Godbold, supra note 10, at 967.
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in the Eleventh Circuit has been one of the new court's highest priorities.
Generally, "[h]abeas corpus cases are an especially sensitive area,'m but
the most "difficult and demanding" appeals are those brought by state
prisoners sentenced to death.24 Death sentence cases account for forty to
fifty appeals each year, and almost every appeal continues through the
system to the Supreme Court's docket.2s The Eleventh Circuit has
contributed much more than its share of these difficult cases. By Judge
Godbold's count, nearly half of the Supreme Court's leading death penalty
decisions of the last decade have involved Eleventh Circuit appeals.26
The most disagreeable extracurricular episode of the first decade may
have been the investigation and impeachment of District Judge Alcee
Hastings. Hastings was indicted in 1981 on criminal charges of bribery,
conspiracy, and obstruction of justice, allegedly involving a bribe by an
attorney to give lenient sentences to the attorney's clients. At separate trials,
the attorney was convicted, but Hastings was acquitted. Elaborate
proceedings were conducted by the Eleventh Circuit, which eventually
recommended that the matter be referred to the House of Representatives.
The House voted to impeach and the Senate convicted Hastings and
removed him from judicial office. The episode lasted more than six years
and was characterized by the most serious of charges and countercharges:
by claims of racism made by Hastings which were ultimately rejected, by
accompanying litigation that raised issues of constitutional dimension, and
by the inevitable distraction and turmoil endemic to such serious proceed-
ings. In the end, the Eleventh Circuit performed this difficult and distasteful
task most admirably. Judge Godbold concludes:
These lengthy and difficult proceedings reached beyond the confines of
charges against Hastings. They established important principles, and a
methodology, for handling within the judiciary serious misconduct
charges against judicial officers. Hastings was the first federal judge to
be impeached after acquittal on underlying criminal charges. The
proceedings demonstrated that in a judicial conduct matter the federal
judiciary had the capacity to investigate and to act in the most difficult
of circumstances.27
23. Id. at 977.
24. Id. at 974.
25. /d. at 974, 976.
26. Id. at 976; see infra text accompanying notes 236-65.
27. Godbold, supra note 10, at 982; see also Victoria Santoro, Comment, Federal
Judges' Absolute Immunity from Criminal Prosecution Prior to Impeachment: United States
v. Hastings, 7 NOVA LJ. 623 (1983).
HeinOnline -- 19 Nova L. Rev. 330 1994-1995
330 Nova Law Review Vol. 19
The most tragic event of the first decade was the assassination of
Circuit Judge Robert S. Vance in 1989. The heartfelt sense of loss
described by Judge Godbold on behalf of himself and his colleagues is a
fitting testimonial to Judge Vance,28 but it also underscores and further
justifies the high regard the Nation continues to show its federal appellate
courts. The men and women who have served on the Eleventh Circuit have
carried on the grand tradition of Article III of the Constitution. They have
served above and beyond the call ofjudicial duty, often under difficult and
challenging circumstances. In this regard, the Eleventh Circuit is not a court
apart from the larger whole, spanning only two decades. Rather, it is part
of a larger whole, with a history that spans two centuries.
III. ORGANIZATION
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, like the
other courts of appeals, is be~t described as a "case-deciding court.,,29 This
is to say that the Eleventh Circuit's "day-to-day work is decisional in the
common law tradition."30
It considers and decides discrete controversies and, where appropriate,
records in an opinion its decision and its reasoning process. A decision
may do no more than decide the dispute. Or it may add by accretion
to the body of law, a bit here, an explanation there. Occasionally a
decision may extend the law to new territory. But ordinarily extension
of the law is a consequence of decision-making, not a pursuit of law-
making.3!
The organization followed here is to collect Supreme Court decisions
between 1981-1991 in which the Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari
to the Eleventh Circuit and sort them into the following common law
subject areas for discussion: Administrative Law; Antitrust; Civil Procedure
and Federal Jurisdiction; Constitutional Law; Criminal Law and Procedure;
Evidence; Labor Law; and Taxation.
28. Godbold, supra note 10, at 983-84.
29. Id. at 984.
30. Id.
31. Id.; see BAKER, supra note 2, at 14-17; see a/so POSNER, supra note 15, at 294-315.
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It may seem odd to begin a survey of a court's contribution to the
national law with what may be described as "agency law," but the average
citizen likely will only see the inside of a courtroom, especially a federal
courtroom, when called to jury duty. The reality is that most "Americans
usually deal with their government through the administrative process.'>32
Administrative law, broadly defined, describes the legal structure of the
executive branch, especially the quasi-independent agencies, along with the
procedural restraints, especially judicial review, with which the government
is administered. At the constitutional level, administrative law includes
concerns for procedural due process and separation of powers, but the most
important constraints on the federal agencies are at the level of statutory
law. The first federal judicial task always is to assure that the agency is
being faithful to the congressional intent in the legislation creating the
particular program. Second, other more general statutes, like the Adminis-
trative Procedures Act,33 oblige the federal courts to act as a kind of
watch-dog over the agencies. Since the Roosevelt era, these agencies have
grown in size, importance, and responsibility; consequently, the judicial
tasks have grown apace.34
The generic drug industry lost an important federal regulation decision
in United States v. Generix Drug Corp.3S A unanimous Supreme Court
held that new "drugs," as the term is used in the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, included generic drug products and, therefore, such products
were subject to prior FDA approval, even though the active ingredients had
been separately approved.36 The drug manufacturer made a number of
arguments based on legislative history and administrative practice as applied
to the generic marketing of prescription and over-the-counter drugs, but to
no avail. That was not the plain meaning of the term, at least the meaning
32. David King, Administrative Law, 18 TEx. TECH L. REv. 237, 237 (1987).
33. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
34. See generally Robert F. Vargo, Real Estate Transactions: The Existence of a
Federal Security, 14 CUMBo L. REv. 301 (1984); Judy Bateman Shepura, Comment,
Fiduciary Duties Under ERISA: Interpretations Within the Eleventh Circuit, 19 CUMBo L.
REv. 131 (1988); Sally Clark Bowers & Linda K. Browning, Eleventh Circuit, Rule IOb-5:
The "State ofthe Mind" Elements in the Eleventh Circuit, 12 CUMBo L. REv. 633 (1982);
Joan M. Vecchioli, Note, SecuritiesRegulation: The Sale ofa Closely-HeldBusiness in Light
ofLandreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 15 STETSON L. REv. 619 (1986).
35. 460 U.S. 453 (1983).
36. /d. at 461.
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plain to the Supreme Court, which reversed the court of appeals. The three-
judge panel of the Eleventh Circuit had sided with the manufacturer to reach
the common sense conclusion that the term "new drug" referred only to the
active ingredient, and not to the inactive "excipients," such as coatings,
binders, and capsules.37
Sullivan v. Hudson38 was an important ruling to the millions of retired
persons residing within the geographical jurisdiction ofthe Eleventh Circuit,
as well as in the rest of the country.39 After the Department of Health and
Human Services denied the claimant's application for Social Security
disability benefits, she sought federal court review. The district court
affirmed the agency's decision, but the Eleventh Circuit reversed because
the Secretary had not followed applicable regulations.40 On remand, the
claimant was awarded benefits, and subsequently sought attorneys' fees
under the Equal Access to Justice Act.41 The district court denied the fees
and the claimant brought an appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, which held in
her favor and directed that attorneys' fees be awarded.42 The Supreme
Court agreed with the conclusion of the Eleventh Circuit and held that it
was within the district court's power under the Act to award a Social
Security claimant attorneys' fees for representation provided during the
administrative proceedings which were held pursuant to the district court's
order remanding the action to the Secretary.43
The same Act was involved in a second decision in an otherwise
unrelated area of administrative law that was decided differently. The
Eleventh Circuit held that the Equal Access to Justice Act did not apply to
deportation proceedings.44 The Supreme Court affirmed the Eleventh
Circuit decision, which held that the administrative proceedings were not
37. United States v. Generix Drug Corp., 654 F.2d 1114, 1120 (5th Cir. Unit B Sept.
1981) (Hill, J., for Markey & Clark, JJ.).
38. 490 U.S. 877 (1989).
39. See Bernard P. Matthews, Jr., 8omment, Social Security Continuing Disability
Reviews and the Practice ofNonacquiescence, 16 CUMBo L. REv. 111 (1985); Anthony 1.
Russo, Comment, The Social Security Disability Programs: Representing Claimants Under
the Changing Law, 14 STETSON L. REv. 131 (1984).
40. Hudson V. Heckler, 755 F.2d 781, 785 (11 th Cir. 1985).
41. 28 U.S.c. § 2412(d)(I)(A) (1988).
42. Hudson V. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 839 F.2d 1453, 1460 n.9 (11th
Cir. 1988) (Johnson, J., for Clark & Dumbauld, JJ.).
43. Sullivan, 490 U.S. at 892.
44. Ardestani v. United States Dep't of Justice, INS, 904 F.2d 1505, 1515 (11th Cir.
1990) (Fay, J., for Roney, J.; Pittman, 1., dissenting).
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adversaIy adjudications for which the government had waived sovereign
immunity, and authorized the award of attorneys' fees and costS.45
One piece of the difficult issue of political asylum found its way
through the Eleventh Circuit in a case involving Haitians. In Ray v. United
States Department of Justice, INS,46 some Haitians sought the names of
other Haitian nationals who had been returned to Haiti, relying on the
Freedom of Information Act.47 The district court ordered the State
Department to disclose the information which had been redacted from the
requested documents and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.48 The Supreme
Court, however, reversed and held that the disclosure would violate the
subjects' weighty interests in privacy.49 According to the majority, the
interests of the public and those making the request were not sufficient to
justify the disclosure.
The issue in King v. St. Vincent's HospitaZSO was whether the
Veterans' Reemployment Rights Acf t implicitly limits the length of
militaIy service after which a member of the Armed Services retains a right
to civilian reemployment. The Eleventh Circuit had determined that the
employee's request for a three-year leave of absence, so the employee could
perform a tour of duty in the National Guard, was per se unreasonable under
the ACt.52 Reading the statute as a whole, considering the Act alongside
related legislation, and with an eye on the underlying congressional purpose,
the Supreme Court reversed, inferring that the reemployment guarantee was
unqualified and absolute.53
Even this small sampling of the administrative law decisions demon-
strates how more and more areas of life have become "federalized" under
national legislation and why the Congress has assigned the critical function
of agency oversight to the courts of appeals in the administrative scheme.
45. Ardestani v. INS, 112 S. Ct 515, 521 (1991).
46. 908 F.2d 1549 (11th Cir. 1990) (Gibson, J., for Fay & Johnson, JJ.). See generally
Ellen B. Gwynn, Note, Race and National Origin Discrimination and the Haitian
Detainees-Jeanv. Nelson, 105 S. Ct. 2992 (1985), 14 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 333 (1986).
47. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
48. Ray, 908 F.2d at 1561.
49. United States Dep't of State v. Ray, 112 S. Ct 541, 542 (1991).
50. II2 S. Ct 570 (1991).
51. 38 U.S.C. § 4324(d) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
52. St Vincent's Hosp. v. King, 901 F.2d 1068, 1072 (11th Cir. 1990) (Tuttle, J., for
Roney & Hill, JJ.).
53. King, 112 S. Ct at 575.
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V. ANTITRUST LAW
Vol. 19
Antitrust law is comprised of a body of statutes, judicial decisions,
administrative regulations, and enforcement activities designed to regulate
market structure and competitive behavior in the national economy. The
core principles of antitrust law reflect a fundamental belief in the market
mechanism, i.e., the belief that economic policies are best determined by
disaggregated, independent, profit seeking firms striving to satisfy consum-
ers who themselves are seeking to maximize satisfaction through individual
market choices. Beyond purely economic considerations, there is a
background of political mistrust for any concentration of power in a
democracy. Whether these assumptions are still valid within the modem
regulatory state and how they might be transformed by the reality of a
global marketplace are questions beyond the Supreme Court and this
discussion.
When two rival bar review companies agreed that one of them would
withdraw from the Georgia market, some former law students did what they
had been taught to do; they brought suit, alleging a violation of the Sherman
Act.54 In Palmer v. ERG of Georgia, Inc.,55 the Supreme Court had little
trouble concluding that the students' theory of the case was sound. A
market allocation agreement between competitors, who had previously
competed in the Georgia market, could be an illegal restraint of trade of the
state market even though the arrangement was that one company would take
the Georgia market and the other would have the whole rest of the country.
It only took a short per curiam opinion to explain this to the Eleventh
Circuit. The three-judge panel had struggled with several procedural issues
surrounding the antitrust claim and had divided on the substantive issue.56
On appeal, the court of appeals majority seemed disposed to defer to the
district court, while the dissenting circuit judge seemed less willing to do
SO.57 Agreeing with the panel dissenter that there was enough to the case
to get beyond summary judgment, the Supreme Court reversed.58
A perennial issue of antitrust law is whether the alleged bad actors are
private entities subject to the antitrust laws or whether they are state actors
54. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-36 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
55. 498 U.S. 46 (1990).
56. Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, Inc., 874 F.2d 1417 (11th Cir. 1989).
57. Compare id. at 1422-28 (Hatchett, J., for Fitzpatrick, J.) with id. at 1430-41 (Clark,
J., dissenting).
58. Palmer, 498 U.S. at 49.
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and entitled to an immunity by virtue of the so-called "state action"
doctrine.59 The Supreme Court, as is the fashion these days, has developed
a two-prong test: The challenged restraint must be one clearly articulated
and affirmatively expressed as a state policy, and the state must actively
supervise any private anti-competitive conduct.60 The Supreme Court
determined that this test was satisfied in Southern Motor Carriers Rate
Conference, Inc. v. United States.61 Thus, the United States could not
bring suit against two rate bureaus composed of motor common carriers
operating in four states which were expressly permitted to submit collective
rate proposals to the public service commissions in each state. The case had
rolled around in the court of appeals for a three-judge hearing62 and an en
banc rehearing.63 Once again, the court of appeals dissenters had it right,
at least according to the Supreme Court majority who concluded that the
rate making had been expressly permitted by virtue of the state's clear intent
to displace price competition.64 The otherwise private action need not be
compelled by the state to trigger immunity under the case law.
In ICC v. American Trucking Ass 'ns,65 the Supreme Court was called
on to reconcile the Motor Carrier Act of 198066 with the powers of the
Interstate Commerce Commission ("ICC"). Ever since the Reed-Bulwinkle
Act of 1948,67 motor carriers have enjoyed immunity from antitrust laws
to enter into rate bureaus of the kind described in Southern Motor Carriers
Rate Conference, Inc. 68 To receive this immunity, the rate bureaus
themselves must make an application with the ICC describing their rate
making procedures. In 1981, the ICC announced it was going to implement
the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 by fashioning a new remedy for rate-bureau
violations: a tariff submitted in substantial violation of a rate-bureau
59. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
60. California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105
(1980).
61. 471 U.S. 48, 65-66 (1985).
62. United States v. Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc., 672 F.2d 469 (5th
Cir. Unit B 1982) (Johnson, J., for Scott, J.; Hill, J., dissenting).
63. United States v. Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc., 702 F.2d 532 (5th
Cir. Unit B 1983) (en bane).
64. Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference. Inc., 471 U.S. at 65-66.
65. 467 U.S. 354 (1984).
66. 49 U.S.C. § 10706(b)(3) (1988).
67. 49 U.S.C. app. § 5 (1988), repealed by Pub. L. No. 95-473, § 4(b)-(c), 92 Stat.
1466, 1470 (1978). The substance ofthe Reed-Bulwinkle Act of 1948 is now codified in 49
U.S.C. § 10706 (1988).
68. See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
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agreement would be rejected automatically and retroactively. The Eleventh
Circuit held that the ICC lacked this authority.69 Over dissent, the
Supreme Court reversed and ruled that the ICC's newly announced policy
was allowed under the agency's discretionary power to elaborate upon
express statutory remedies when necessary to achieve specified statutory
goals.70
While the Eleventh Circuit's rulings were not used as vehicles for any
profound rethinking of the antitrust law, the decisions described above did
contribute interstitially to the maintenance and operation of the federal law
on the subject.7 ) This occurred even though the beginning decade of the
Eleventh Circuit overlapped with a relatively inactive period in antitrust law
history.
VI. CIVIL PROCEDURE AND FEDERAL JURISDICTION
The threshold "principle of first importance [is] that the federal courts
are courts of limited jurisdiction."n Thus, technically speaking, every
federal court decision is a decision about federal jurisdiction. Ever since the
beginning of the federal courts, the jurisdictional inquiry has always been
two-dimensional. The scope of federal judicial power is determined first,
by examining Article III of the Constitution and second, by interpreting
some enabling statute of the Congress.73 Limits on judicial power apply
to exercises over the persons of the litigants as well as over the subject
matter of the litigation. Once a case or controversy is deemed to belong in
federal court, the suit must follow an elaborate trial routine of procedural
rules and practices toward some remedy, followed by at least one appeal of
right. Eleventh Circuit decisions about each of these phases found their way
onto the Supreme Court's docket.
69. American Trucking Ass'ns v. United States, 688 F.2d 1337, 1355 (11th Cir. 1982)
(Godbold, C.J., for Anderson & Hoffman, JJ.).
70. American Trucking Ass 'ns, 467 U.S. at 371.
71. See Richard A. Booth, Foreword: The Seventh Circuit as a Commercial Court, 65
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 667 (1989).
72. CHARLES A. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 7, at 27 (5th ed. 1994); see
also Patricia T. Mandt, Note, Application of Standing Principles in the Eleventh Circuit:
ACLU v. Rabun County Chamber of Commerce, 35 ALA. L. REv. 377 (1984); Ruth E.
Todd-Chattin, Note, Save Our Dunesv. Alabama Department ofEnvironmental Management:
Has the Voice ofthe Dunes Been Silenced?, 41 ALA. L. REv. 525 (1990).
73. See, e.g., Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 442 (1850); Hodgson & Thompson
v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303, 304 (1809); Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75,
93 (1807).
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The mootness doctrine focuses judicial attention on "the sequence of
litigation events out of a traditional and constitutional concern for the very
existence of a 'case or controversy' itself."74 If a matter earlier in
controversy is somehow resolved, the judgment of the federal court has
nothing to accomplish. The lack of a judicial task ends the Article III
power. Justiciability must be actual and present, not merely speculative or
historical. Legislation can overtake the litigation and render it moot. For
example, in Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp.,7S the Supreme Court
declared the case moot due to amendments to a federal statute that were
enacted while the case was pending. Thus, the Eleventh Circuit's judicial
handiwork, analyzing rather arcane issues of federal banking law, was
rendered a nullity.76
Alternatively, the postfiling conduct of third party nonlitigants may
eliminate the need for federal court intervention, as happened in Iron Arrow
Honor Society v. Heckler.77 In that case, an all male honorary organization
had brought suit against the Secretary of Health and Human Services,
seeking injunctive and declaratory relief to prohibit the Secretary from
interpreting a federal regulation to require that a private university ban the
organization from campus. When the president ofthe university voluntarily
banned the organization for as long as it continued its all male membership
policy, the Supreme Court announced that the federal case was closed.78
The majority drew an important distinction between voluntary discon-
tinuance by a party defendant-which does not moot the controversy for the
practical reason that there would be nothing to stop the defendant from
going right back to the offending behavior-and the situation before the
Court, which involved a voluntary, unilateral, and unequivocal action by a
third party nonlitigant.79 This brought an end to a lengthy proceeding that
had gone up and down the federal courts for several years, to the relief of
at least some of the Eleventh Circuit judges.80
74. James C. Hill & Thomas E. Baker, Dam Federal Jurisdiction!, 32 EMORY LJ. 3,
18 (1983).
75. 494 U.S. 472 (1990).
76. Continental Illinois Corp. v. Lewis, 827 F.2d 1517 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam)
(Fay, Clark, & Henderson, JJ.), opinion clarified, 838 F.2d 457 (11th Cir. 1988) (per curiam),
and vacated, 494 U.S. 472 (1990).
77. 464 U.S. 67 (1983).
78. Id. at 73.
79. ld. at 71-72.
80. See Iron Arrow Honor Soc'y v. Heckler, 702 F.2d 549 (5th Cir. Unit B 1983)
(Tuttle, 1., for Anderson, J.); id. at 565 (Roney, J., dissenting).
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The most important decision arising in the Eleventh Circuit in the area
of civil procedure and federal jurisdiction was Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz,sl decided by the Supreme Court in 1985. The issue was at
once important and difficult, witnessed by the fact that the Supreme Court
was revisiting the issue for the umpteenth time in the Rudzewicz decision
itself, and since then has returned to the issue in later cases, in an as yet
unsuccessful effort to "get it right."
The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the district court's
exercise of jurisdiction pursuant to the Florida "long-arm statute" violated
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A divided panel of
the Eleventh Circuit concluded that "Olurisdiction under the[] circumstances
would offend the fundamental fairness which is the touchstone of due
process."S2 The Supreme Court majority thought otherwise.s3 In a rather
metaphysical discussion of the so-called "minimum contacts" line of cases,
the Supreme Court basically told the Burger King Corporation to "'have it
your way'... by allowing its Florida diversity action to proceed against a
Michigan franchisee who refused to vacate the restaurant's premises after
termination of his franchise."s4
An earlier decision had made it clear that a nonresident defendant is not
subject to specific jurisdiction unless he has directed acts toward the
forum.ss Thus, the Burger King holding clarified that not all of the
defendant's contacts related to the controversy must be with the forum. In
fact, the defendant-franchisee had far more controversy related contacts with
Michigan than with Florida and had never actually visited Florida. The
Supreme Court explained that an individual's contract with an out-of-state
party, without more, does not automatically establish sufficient minimum
contacts in the other party's home forum. s6 Instead, a proper due process
analysis should take into account the prior negotiations and contemplated
future consequences, along with the terms of the contract and both parties'
course of dealings, to answer the question whether the defendant has
purposely established minimum contacts with the forum and, therefore, is
81. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
82. Burger King Corp. v. Macshara, 724 F.2d 1505, 1513 (lIth Cir. 1984) (Vance, J.,
for Pittman, 1.; Johnson, J., dissenting).
83. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
84. Summary and Analysis, Michigan FranchiseeSubject to Florida's Long-Arm Statute,
53 U.S.L.W. 1177, 1177 (1985); Rex R. Perschbacher, Minimum Contacts Reapplied: Mr.
Justice Brennan Has It His Way in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 1986 ARIz. ST. L.1. 585
(1986).
85. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
86. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 478-79.
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subject to suit there. On the facts, the majority found a substantial and
continuing relationship between the Michigan defendant-franchisee and the
plaintiffs Miami headquarters. In its totality of the circumstances analysis,
the High Court also made something of the fact that the defendant was an
experienced and sophisticated businessman, represented by counsel, who
could not point to any other factors establishing the unconstitutionality of
the assertion of personal jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court's decision seems to be something of an effort'to
find' some theoretical accommodation between the metaphysics of due
process and the contemporary business reality that controversy related
contacts often occur in multiple states, each of which may have a police
power regulatory interest in applying its own contract law: "[t]o recognize
specific jurisdiction only in a place which is the exclusive source of related
contacts would often deny [alternative] forum[ states] the legitimate
expression of their regulatory interests."87 This is the underlying principle
justifying jurisdiction in these cases: the forum state's traditional police
power to regulate commercial activities occurring within the state.88
During the 1980s, the federal courts' workload reflected the fact that
the Nation's economy was sputtering. Bankruptcy filing increased, and so
there were more bankruptcy appeals in the pipeline. Bankruptcy jurisdiction
is exclusively federal, of course, and it can be a source of federal friction
with the state courts. Owen v. Owen89 dealt with one such friction. In
Owen, the Supreme Court held that ajudiciallien may be avoided under the
bankruptcy statute,90 as impairing a debtor's state law exemptions, even
though the state has defined exempt property in such a way as specifically
to exclude property encumbered by such liens.91 This reversed the
Eleventh Circuit's reconciliation of the federal provision with the state
law.92
87. GENE R. SHREVE & PETER RAVEN-HANSEN, UNDERSTANDING CIVIL PROCEDURE §
17[C], at 73 (1989).
88. See generally Asahi Metal IndustIy Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987);
Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770
(1984); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 286.
89. 500 U.S. 305 (1991).
90. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (1988).
91. 500 U.S. at 313-14.
92. In re Owen, 877 F.2d 44, 47 (11th Cir. 1989) (Roney, C.J., for Powell & Tjoflat,
JJ.).
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Under the Feres93 doctrine, the United States Government has no
Federal Tort Claims Act94 liability for injuries to members of the armed
services when those injuries arise out of or in the course of military
service.95 The issue was analyzed at great length by the Eleventh Circuit,
first by a three-judge panel96 and then, by the divided en bane court on
rehearing.97 The Supreme Court relied on the circuit judges' debate to
conclude that a service member killed during activity incident to military
serVice could not recover under the ACt.98 More particularly, the majority
ruled that the death of a Coast Guard helicopter pilot during a rescue
mission at sea was activity incident to military service and his widow could
not bring an action against the government under the ACt.99
When a federal law creates a duty without expressly providing a
remedy, a federal court may imply a remedy under the law. The importance
of this implication is that it automatically and necessarily creates federal
jurisdiction over the newly created cause of action. 100 The remedy can be
implied directly under the Constitution. In United States v. Stanley, 101 a
divided Supreme Court rejected the claim of a former serviceman against
military officers and civilian researchers to recover for injuries he sustained
as a result of a secret Army experiment in which LSD was administered to
him. 102 The majority found support for this conclusion in its precedents
cautioning against routinely implying a cause of action under the Constitu-
tion, as well as in the unique disciplinary structure found in the military, to
93. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
94. 28 U.S.c. § 1346 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). See generally Norma J. Mungenast,
Eleventh Circuit, Federal Tort Claims Act: The Development and Application 0/ the
Discretionary Function Exemption, 13 CUMBo L. REv. 535 (1983).
95. Feres, 340 U.S. at 146.
96. Johnson v. United States, 749 F.2d 1530 (11th Cir. 1985) (Fay, J., for Vance &
MacMahon, JJ.).
97. Johnson v. United States, 779 F.2d 1492 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (en banc)
(Johnson, Roney, Tjoflat, & Hill, JJ., dissenting).
98. United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 691-92 (1987), rev 'g779 F.2d 1492 (11th
Cir. 1986).
99. Id.
100. See Thomas E. Baker, Thinking About Federal Jurisdiction-o/Serpents and
Swallows, 17 ST. MARY'S LJ. 239, 265-66 (1986).
101. 483 U.S. 669 (1987).
102. Id. at 686.
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which Congress had acquiesced in various statutes.103 This part of the
Eleventh Circuit decision104 was reversed. IDS
In a second decision, Bush v. Lucas,106 the Supreme Court again
disallowed a remedy directly under the Constitution, this time under the
First Amendment. Suit was brought against the government by an employee
alleging a retaliatory demotion and defamation in response to his public
criticism of the agency for which he worked. Because the claims arose out
of an employment relationship which was governed by comprehensive
procedural and substantive provisions affording meaningful remedies against
the United States, the majority concluded that implying a cause of action
under the Free Speech Clause was unnecessary and would be inappropri-
ate. 107 This result and reasoning followed the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals' treatment of the case. 108
The implied remedy can be based on some regulatory statute as well.
In Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools,109 a decision reversing the
Eleventh Circuit,110 the Supreme Court permitted a high school student,
who alleged that she was subjected to sexual harassment and abuse by her
coach/teacher, to seek monetary damages in addition to other equitable
relief. III The Court held that an individual's damage action was implied
under Title IX,112 which prohibits gender discrimination in any program
receiving federal funds. 113
The only decision of note under the Erie doctrinel14 involved a
choice of forum clause in a freely negotiated commercial contract. In
Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., lIS the Supreme Court affirmed
the Eleventh Circuit decision and held that federal law and not state law
controlled whether to grant a motion to transfer the case to the venue
103. Id. at 679 (citation omitted).
104. United States v. Stanley, 786 F.2d 1490 (11th Cir. 1986) (Hatchett, J., for
Henderson & Allgood, JJ.).
105. Stanley, 483 U.S. at 686.
106. 462 U.S. 367 (1983).
107. Id at 388-89.
108. 647 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. Unit B June 1981)(Roney, J., for Godbold & Simpson, n.).
109. 112 S. Ct 1028 (1992).
110. 911 F.2d 617 (11th Cir. 1990) (Henley, J., for Hill, J.; Johnson, J., concurring).
111. 112 S. Ct at 1038.
112. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1988).
113. Franklin, 112 S. Ct at 1036.
114. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); see also Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S.
460 (1965).
115. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22 (1988), affg 779 F.2d 643 (11th
Cir. 1986).
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approved in the written contract. ll6 According to the majority, the general
federal transfer of venue statutell7-which applies to transfers for the
convenience of the parties and witnesses in the interest of justice-was
controlling, as that statute was annotated in federal court interpretations. ll8
Pursuant to the Seventh Amendment,1I9 ratified in 1791, federal
litigants enjoy the right to trial by jury, although the right is textually
limited to "suits at common law." Consequently, a court deciding whether
a party has a right to a jury trial must act as a historian of eighteenth
century English civil procedure. In Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 120
a majority of the historians on the Supreme Court rejected the conclusions
of the Eleventh Circuit121 historians. The majority concluded that the
Seventh Amendment entitles a litigant who has not submitted a claim
against a bankruptcy estate to a jury trial when that party is sued by the
bankruptcy trustee to recover an allegedly fraudulent money transfer. 122
Issues involving remedies figured in several Supreme Court reviews of
Eleventh Circuit decisions. In the\.first, Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd,123
the High Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit and held that the Warsaw
Convention,124 which sets forth conditions under which an international air
carrier can be held liable for injuries to passengers, does not allow for the
recovery of damages for mental or psychic injuries unaccompanied by some
manifestation of physical injury. 125 In the second, INS v. Jean,126 the
Supreme Court affirmed the Eleventh Circuit's understanding127 that the
Equal Access to Justice Act128 allowed for an award of fees against the
116. Id. at 32.
117. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988).
118. Stewart Org., 487 U.S. at 22; see also Sara E. Akin, Note, Review ofIntercircuit
Transfer Orders Under Section 1404(a), 35 ALA. L. REv. 167 (1984).
119. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
120. 492 U.S. 33 (1989).
121. Id. at 64-65, rev 'g sub nom. by an equally divided Court, In re Chase & Sanborn
Corp., 835 F.2d 1341 (11th Cir. 1988) (Morgan, J., for Fay & Hatchett, n.).
122. Id. at 64.
123. 499 U.S. 530 (1991), rev'g 872 F.2d 1462 (11th Cir. 1989) (Anderson, J., for
Johnson & Atkins, n.).
124. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1502 (1988).
125. Eastern Airlines, 499 U.S. at 552-53.
126. 496 U.S. 154 (1990).
127. Jean v. Nelson, 863 F.2d 759 (lIth Cir. 1988) (Clark, J., for Eschbach, J.;
Kravitch, 1., concurring and dissenting in part).
128. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(I)(A) (1988). See generally Alice M. Bradley & Bryan
Essary, Comment, The Treatment of Attorney's Fee Enhancements in Alabama and the
Eleventh Circuit: Justice! The Law! My Ducats and My Daughter, 20 CUMBo L. REv. 769
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government in the fee litigation stage of a proceeding without a second
finding that the fee was substantially justified.129 In a third remedies
decision, the Supreme Court affirmed an Eleventh Circuit holding that
conduct by federal officials must be discretionary in nature, as well as
within the scope of their employment, before the conduct can be deemed to
be absolutely immune from state-law tort liability. 130
A fourth case involving the law of remedies resulted in a reversal of
the Eleventh Circuit. 131 In Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Alabama Bank,132
the Supreme Court held that the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals had
erred by refusing to consider the possible preclusive effect, under state law,
of a state court judgment which had rejected a res judicata claim based on
a previous federal judgment.133 The unanimous Court was loathe to allow
the highly intrusive remedy ofa federal court injunction against enforcement
of the state court judgment. Instead, the Court ruled that the Full Faith and
Credit Clause requires that the federal court give the state court judgment,
including the resolution of the res judicata issue, the same preclusive effect
it would have in another court of the same state. 134
The last remedies decision of the period returned the Supreme Court's
attention to the procedural puzzles of affirmative action or reverse discrimi-
nation. 135 White firefighters brought suit alleging that they were being
denied promotions in favor of less qualified blacks under a consent decree
that had been entered in a previous employment discrimination lawsuit
between black firefighters and the county. The Eleventh Circuit allowed the
plaintiffs to challenge the consent decree. 136 Even though they had failed
to intervene in the earlier employment discrimination lawsuit, in Martin v.
(1990).
129. Jean, 496 U.S. at 165-66.
130. Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U.S. 292, 295 (1988), aff'g785 F.2d 1551 (11th Cir. 1986)
(per curiam) (Johnson, Hatchett, & Murphy, JJ.). Westfall was subsequently superseded by
the Federal Employee Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988, which is
codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (1988). See generally Robert S. Glazier, Note, An Argument
Against Judicial Immunity for Employment Decisions, 11 NOVA L. REv. 1127 (1987).
131. Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Ala. Bank, 474 U.S. 518 (1986).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 525, rev'g747 F.2d 1367 (lIth Cir. 1984) (Thornbeny, 1., for Godbold, 1.;
Hill, 1., dissenting).
134. Id.
135. InreBirmingham ReverseDiscrimination Employment Litig., 833 F.2d 1492(11th
Cir. 1987), aff'd sub nom. Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989).
136. Id. at 1498 (Tjotlat, J., for Henderson, J.; Anderson, J., dissenting).
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Wilks,137 the Supreme Court allowed plaintiffs to challenge the employ-
ment decisions taken pursuant to the consent decree.
Finally, the Supreme Court reached two decisions on the subject of
appellate procedures of a rather technical nature. 138 In one, the Supreme
Court vindicated the authority of a United States court of appeals to award
damages to an appellee upon determining that the underlying appeal is
frivolous. 139 In the other, the Court reconciled Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 59(e) with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(4) to hold
that a postjudgment motion for discretionary prejudgment interest constituted
a motion to alter or amend the judgment, which had the effect of nullifying
a notice of appeal filed before the district court ruled on the motion.140
It should be neither surprising nor unexpected that the Eleventh
Circuit's procedural and jurisdictional decisions are so numerous and that
the Court of Appeals has already made such a telling contribution to the
national law on these subjects. The main role of the intermediate courts of
appeals is to supervise the district courts. 141 District courts in the Eleventh
Circuit have large and diverse caseloads. Consequently, the appeals of right
that are generated can be expected to present novel and difficult issues. 142
VII. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
American Constitutionalism represents an original contribution to
political thought. Constitutional law describes the relationship between the
137. 490 U.S. 755, 769 (1989).
138. See generally Mark A. Hall, The Jurisdictional Nature of the Time to Appeal, 21
GA. L. REv. 399 (1986); Kurt M. Saunders, Plying the Erie Waters: Choice ofLaw in the
Deterrence ofFrivolous Appeals, 21 GA. L. REv. 653 (1987).
139. Burlington N. R.R. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1,8 (1987), rev'g768 F.2d 1287 (11th Cir.
1985) (per curiam) (Vance, Johnson, & Morgan, JJ.).
140. Ostemeck v. Ernst & Whinney, 489 U.S. 169, 173-74 (1989), affg Ostemeck v.
E.T. Barwick Industries, Inc., 825 F.2d i521 (11th Cir. 1987) (Anderson, J., for Hatchett &
Tuttle, JJ.).
141. See generally Steven A. Childress, Standards ofReview in Eleventh Circuit Civil
Appeals, 9 NOVA L.J. 260 (1985).
142. See generally Joseph W. Little et aI., Section 1983 Liability ofMunicipalities and
Private Entities Operating Under Color ofMunicipal Law, 14 STETSON L. REv. 565 (1985);
Randall R. Rader, Section 1983, The Civil Rights Action: Legislative and Judicial Directions,
15 CUMBo L. REv. 571 (1985); Jeanne Maguire, Note, Ghost of Injunctions Past:
Resurrection ofMunicipal Liability for Unintentional Acts, 17 STETSON L. REv. 857 (1988)
(discussing Williams v. City of Dothan, 818 F.2d 755 (lIth Cir. 1987)); Christopher M.
Shulman, Note, Cave Canem--PoliceDepartment Liability and Equitable Standing Under 42
u.s.c. § 1983, 19 STETSON L. REv. 973 (1990).
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individual and the government. 143 In this relationship, there are explicit
as well as implicit limitations on the power of government which guarantee
individual rights. In the peculiar American version of this social compact,
the judicial branch of government explicates these rights and is often called
on to play the role of the guarantor of civil rights and civil liberties. The
Supreme Court, of course, takes the lead in this regard, but the United States
Courts of Appeals perform the role of supporting actor in this drama of
democracy. 144 The Eleventh Circuit struggled with the often difficult
accommodations between government power and individual liberty in
important areas of constitutional law: Preemption; Procedural Due Process;
Takings; Race Discrimination; Voting Rights; Privacy; Free Speech and
Press; and Free Exercise Of Religion.
While it is a familiar and well-established principle that the Supremacy
Clause of the United States Constitutionl4S invalidates all state laws that
interfere with or are contrary to federal law, the course of application ofthat
principle has taken some strange turns. In the exercise of its Commerce
Clausel46 power, Congress can expressly preempt a specific form of state
regulation or preclude state regulation of the subject. 147 Alternatively, the
courts often find an implied congressional intent to preempt a particular area
or even a whole field in which the federal interest is dominant. Two
Eleventh Circuit cases "went up" to the Supreme Court under preemption
holdings. In Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories,
Inc. ,148 the Supreme Court reversed and held that federal regulation
governing collection of blood plasma from paid donors did not preempt the
local ordinances which the Eleventh Circuit had thrown out. 149 In Adams
Fruit Co. v. Barrett, ISO the High Court affirmed the Eleventh Circuit
143. See generally Hala Ayoub, Comment, The State Action Doctrine in State and
.Federal Courts, I I FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 893 (1984).
144. See, e.g., Douglas D. Selph, Comment, Taylor v. Ledbetter: Vindicating the
Constitutional Rights ofFoster Children to Adequate Care and Protection, 22 GA. L. REv.
1187 (1988) (analyzing Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791 (11th Cir. 1987».
145. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cL 2.
146. Id. art. I, § 8, cL 3.
147. See John-Edward Alley et aL, Local Governments and the Fair Labor Standards
Act: The Impact ofGarcia v. SAMTA and the 1985 FLSA Amendments, IS STETSON L.
REv. 715 (1986).
148. 471 U.S. 707 (1985), rev'g722 F.2d 1526 (lIth Cir. 1984) (Tuttle, 1., for Fay &
Henderson, 11.).
149. Id.
ISO. 494 U.S. 638 (1990), affg 867 F.2d 1305 (11th Cir. 1989) (Vance, J., for Kravitch
& Henderson, 11.).
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holding that the exclusivity provisions in state workers' compensation laws
did not bar migrant workers from bringing a private action under the federal
Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection ActlSI for intentional·
violations of the Act. (S2
The constitutional command of procedural due process obliges the
government to afford a person adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity
to be heard whenever the government deprives the person of property or
liberty.1S3 In Lyng v. Payne,IS4 the Court approved the notice published
by the Secretary of Agriculture in the Federal Register which set out details
and conditions of the particular loan program and which followed the
agency's regulations. The Eleventh Circuit struggled with the issue and had
thought worse of the Secretary's efforts. ISS In a second case, Davis v.
Scherer, (S6 the Supreme Court assumed, for the purposes of its decision,
that a discharged state highway patrol officer had been afforded fundamen-
tally fair process, even though the full hearing would not take place until
after his termination. This decision changed the result the Eleventh Circuit
had reached and consequently changed the outcome on the controlling issue
of qualified immunity for state officials. ls7
The predeprivation procedure versus postdeprivation procedure
distinction, and the property versus liberty distinction both came up again
in Zinermon v. Burch,ls8 when the Supreme Court affirmed the Eleventh
Circuit's en banc decision. ls9 This important precedent for patients' rights
reasoned that when a state can feasibly provide a predeprivation hearing
before taking property, it generally must do so, regardless of the adequacy
of a postdeprivation state court tort remedy.16Q Postdeprivation hearings
151. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1872 (1988); seealso supranotes 83-90 and accompanying text.
152. Adams Fruit Co., 494 U.S. at 650-51.
153. See generally Romaine S. Scott, Mennonite: What Does it Mean to Alabama
Mortgages After Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Morrison?, 36 ALA. L. REv. 969 (1985)
(analyzing FDIC v. Morrison, 747 F.2d 610 (lIth Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1019
(1985)); Michael A. Logan, Note, Power ofSale Foreclosure: What Process is Due?, 36
ALA. L. REv. 1083 (l985) (discussing Morrison, 747 F.2d at 610).
154. 476 U.S. 926 (1986).
155. Payne v. Block, 714 F.2d 1510 (11th Cir.) (Clark, J., for Godbold & Henderson,
n.), modified, 721 F.2d 741 (lIth Cir. 1983), and vacated, 469 U.S. 807 (1984) (mem.).
156. 468 U.S. 183 (1984).
157. Scherer v. Graham, 710 F.2d 838 (11th Cir. 1983), rev'd sub nom. Davis v.
Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984).
158. 494 U.S. 113 (1990).
159. Burch v. Apalachee Community Mental Health Servs., Inc., 840F.2d 797 (11th Cir.
1988) (en banc).
160. Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 138-39.
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may be sufficient in situations when a predeprivation hearing would be
unduly burdensome in proportion to the liberty interest at stake if the state
is genuinely unable to prevent a random deprivation of some liberty interest.
In Zinermon, the Supreme Court held that a mental patient's allegation that
employees at the state institution had admitted him "voluntarily," without
taking any steps to ascertain whether he was competent to consent to his
own admission, stated a good cause of action for deprivation of procedural
due process, even though state tort remedies were available after the
fact. 161 .
While the issue of takings has troubled the Supreme Court for the last
decade or more, and shows no signs of receding,162 the Eleventh Circuit
contributed only one important holding during its first decade in this
area. 163 In FCC v. Florida Power Corp.,I64 the Supreme Court reversed
the Eleventh Circuit165 and held that the Federal Pole Attachments
Act,166. which authorized the FCC to determine just and reasonable rates
that utility companies could charge cable television systems for stringing
cable television, does not give the cable companies any right to use the
utility poles. As to the taking issue, the Court concluded that when the FCC
set the rates, in the absence of parallel state regulations, the lower rates set
by the FCC were not confiscatory and did not effectuate a taking of the
property of the utilities under the Fifth Amendment. 167 Having thus
reasoned, the Court did not reach the Eleventh Circuit's theory of the case
that the Act was an unconstitutional constraint on the judicial power to
determine just compensation.
Issues of race have resonated as issues'of constitutional law for as long
as the Republic has existed under the Constitution of 1787. Constitutional
16I. Id.; see Heller v. Doe, 113 S. Ct 2637 (1993) (holding that mentally retarded
patients can be "voluntarily" admitted by family members under a lower threshold showing
than is applied in the same state's laws for the mentally ill).
162. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct 2886 (1992); Pennell
v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. I (1988).
163. The Eleventh Circuit upheld the Florida Bar Interest on Trust Account Progmm.
Cone v. State Bar of Florida, 819" F.2d 1002 (11th Cir.) (Hill, J., for Johnson & Eschbach,
JJ.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 917 (1987) (mem.). See general/yGregory A. Hearing, Funding
Legal Services for the Poor: Florida's IOTA Program--Now Is the Time to Make It
Mandatory, 16 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 337 (1988); Rachael S. Worthington, Comment,
IOTA-Overcoming Its Current Obstacles, 18 SmrsON L. REv. 415 (1989).
164. 480 U.S. 245 (1987).
165. 772 F.2d 1537 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (Roney, Fay, & Dumbauld, JJ.).
166. 47 U.S.C. § 224 (1988).
167. Florida Power Corp., 480 U.S. at 254; see U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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compromise gave in to slavery and then gave way to apartheid and Jim
Crow which later gave way, at least formally, to the civil rights movement.
Four decades after Brown v. Board ofEducation, 168 issues of race continue
to resonate in constitutional cases. In 1985, the Supreme Court affirmed,
in the strongest terms, a holding of the Eleventh Circuie69 that a provision
in the Alabama State Constitution disenfranchising those convicted ofcrimes
of moral turpitude was unconstitutional because it denied the plaintiffs their
right to vote on the basis of race. The unanimous opinion in Hunter v.
Underwood l70 found that the 1901 enactment, 171 although neutral on its
face, was motivated by an original intent and desire to discriminate against
African-Americans and had effectuated that discriminatory impact ever
since.
Issues about remedies for past racial discrimination have polarized the
Supreme Court in numerous cases for decades. 172 It thus comes as no
surprise that two of the most important equal protection decisions arising in
the first decade of the Eleventh Circuit were about remedies. In the first,
a fractured Supreme Court upheld a requirement that fifty percent of the
promotions in the state Department of Public Safety be awarded to African-
Americans until approximately twenty-five percent of the rank was
comprised of members of that race. The plurality opinion in United States
v. Paradise l73 upheld this remedial decree first by invoking a compelling
state interest to eradicate the past discriminatory exclusion and second by
concluding this was a narrowly tailored solution. This decision was one of
several civil rights cases Congress later overruled, in effect, with the Civil
Rights Act of 1991.174
The second equal protection remedy decision was Freeman v. Pitts. 175
As one of the twin successors of the former Fifth Circuit, the Eleventh
Circuit was called on to provide guidance to district courts contemplating
how and when to end supervision of public school districts stilI operating
under remedial injunctions for de jure segregation. The three-judge panel
168. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
169. UndeIWood v. Hunter, 730 F.2d 614 (11th Cir. 1984) (Vance, 1., for Clark &
Tjoflat, JJ.).
170. 471 U.S. 222 (1985).
171. ALA. CONST. of 1901, art. VIII, § 182.
172. See, e.g., Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990); City ofRichmond
v. lA Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980);
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
173. 480 U.S. 149 (1987).
174. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-2000e (1988).
175. 112 S. Ct. 1430 (1992).
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read Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit precedent to require the district
court to retain jurisdiction in these cases until the school district attained
unitary status in six identified administrative areas for an extended
period. 176 The Supreme Court was of another mind, however, and held
that the district court need not retain active control over every aspect of the
school district until all aspects were unified. 177 Rather, the district court
had jurisdiction and discretion to relinquish control in incremental stages
before full compliance was achieved in every area of school administration.
Considered alongside some other contemporaneous holdings, the Supreme
Court seemed to be signalling that federal district courts could not continue
indefinitely to administer local public schools, even school systems that had
been guilty of invidious racial segregation in the past.178
One of the most controversial constitutional decisions of the Eleventh
Circuit's first decade involved the issue whether a state sodomy statute
violated the fundamental rights of homosexuals. The Bowers v. Hard-
wickl79 case was decided by the narrowest possible margin in the Supreme
Court and by a two to one vote in the Eleventh Circuit. 180 The Supreme
Court concluded, over an intense dissent, that the Constitution did not
protect homosexual relations, even by consenting adults, in the privacy of
their own home. The case and its implications continue to swirl around the
High Court and beyond, without sign of any lessening of the controversy.
In Butterworth v. Smith,181 a reporter who had testified before a grand
jury challenged a state statute that proscribed any disclosure ofthe witness's
own testimony. The Eleventh Circuit held that the statute was unconstitu-
tional and the Supreme Court agreed. 182 The statute violated the First
Amendment rights of free speech and free press without sufficient justifica-
tion, especially with regard to the truthful disclosure of the witness's own
testimony after the grand jury's term ended.
176. Pitts v. Freeman, 887 F.2d 1438, 1450 (11th Cir. 1989) (Hatchett, J., for Fay &
Allgood, n.), rev'd, 112 S. Ct 1430 (1992).
177. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1450.
178. Compare Board ofEduc. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991) with Missouri v. Jenkins,
495 U.S. 33 (1990).
179. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
180. Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202 (11th Cir. 1985) (Johnson, J., for Tuttle, 1.;
Kravitch, 1., concurring and dissenting in part), rev'd, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
181. 494 U.S. 624 (1990), aff'g 866 F.2d 1318 (11th Cir. 1989) (Vance, 1., for Kravitch
& Henderson, n.).
182. Id. at 636.
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First Amendment rights of another kind were involved in Forsyth
County v. Nationalist Movement. 183 An organization brought suit to
challenge a county ordinance that authorized an administrator to vary the fee
charged for assembling and parading to reflect estimated costs for any public
expenses for police and for clean up. The Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc,
held in favor of the challengers. 184 The Supreme Court granted review
and affirmed, holding that the ordinance was facially invalid under
established case law.18s Aside from the legal issues, which were relatively
straightforward and simple, there was a great deal of emotion in the
underlying facts of this case. The county had been the site of the largest
nationally publicized civil rights rally since the 1960s, where an affiliate of
the Ku Klux Klan (the Nationalist Movement) held a counter-demonstration.
Shortly thereafter, the county enacted the challenged ordinance. Two and
one-half years later, the ordinance was constitutionally challenged by the
Nationalist Movement which sought to hold a demonstration opposing the
federal holiday honoring Martin Luther King, Jr.
The last considered decision arising from the Eleventh Circuit is a
reminder of the region's tradition as the "Bible belt.,,186 Parents of public
school children complained about a state statute that authorized a daily
period of silence during the school day for meditation or silent prayer. 18?
The district court dismissed the parents' challenge. The Eleventh Circuit
reversed in part and affirmed in part. 188 In Wallace v. Jaffree,189 the
Supreme Court adhered to past precedents and affirmed the Eleventh
Circuit's decision. It voided the statute because the measure served as an
endorsement of religion and lacked any secular purpose and, therefore, it
violated the Establishment Clause principle that government must pursue a
183. 112 S. Ct. 2395 (1992).
184. Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 934 F.2d 1482 (11th Cir. 1991) (en
bane), affg 913 F.2d 885 (lIth Cir. 1990). There were multiple opinions at both stages of
appeal.
185. Forsyth, 112 S. Ct. at 2405.
186. Jaffree v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 554 F. Supp. 1104 (S.D. Ala. 1983); see also
James J. Dean, Comment, Ceremonial Invocations at Public High School Events and the
EstablishmentClause, 16 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1001 (1989); William Turbeville, Comment,
Constitutional Law: Establishment Clause Standing Clarified, 35 U. FLA. L. REv. 188
(1983) (discussing ACLU v. Rabun County, 678 F.2d 1379 (11th Cir. 1982».
187. Jaffee, 554 F. Supp. at 1104.
188. 705 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1983) (Hatchett, J., for Clark & Scott, JJ.). See generally
James J. McAlpin, Note, Jaffree v. Board of School Commissioners: An Interpretivist
Challenge, 34 ALA. L. REv. 657 (1983).
189. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
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course of complete neutrality in matters of religion. 190 The decision
marked one of the most controversial battles over church and state
jurisprudence in recent years. 191
These decisions from the first decade of the Eleventh Circuit fuIIy and
fairly represent the constitutional law issues of the day. These are the
questions that required answering for our Republic' to function as a
representative democracy. In these accommodations of government power
and individual right, the Eleventh Circuit contributed to the Supreme Court's
continuing effort to respond, for this generation ofAmericans, to what might
be caIIed the Madisonian dilemma: empowering the government sufficiently
for its tasks, yet at the same time limiting it from overreaching the
individual. The "Father of the Constitution" and the drafter and chief
sponsor of the Bill of Rights once explained this perpetual dilemma:
It may be a reflection on human nature that such devices should be
necessary to control the abuses ofgovernment. But what is government
itself but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were
angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern
men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be
necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by
men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the
government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to
control itself.192
VIII. CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
Federal criminal law and criminal procedure are inextricably inter-
twined. 193 The adjectival rules of procedure describe the process by which
the substantive criminal law is enforced. For the Eleventh Circuit, as weIl
as for the Supreme Court, substance and procedure have a duality of policy
190. Id. at 55-56.
191. See generally Kenneth P. Nuger, Judicial Responses to Religious Challenges
Concerning Humanistic Public Education: The Free Exercise and Establishment Debate
Continues, 39 ALA. L. REv. 73 (1987); Rodney K. Smith, Now is the Time for Reflection:
Wallace v. Jaffree and Its Legislative Aftermath, 37 ALA. L. REv. 345 (1986).
192. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
193. See generally Anne S. Emanuel, The Concurrent Sentence Doctrine Dies a Quiet
Death-OrAre the Reports Greatly Exaggerated?, 16 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 269 (1988); David
M. Lazarus, Note, Entrapment: A Review ofthe Principles ofLaw Governing This Defense
as Applied by the Eleventh Circuit Court ofAppeals, 7 NOVA L:J. 611 (1983).
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and constitutionality.194 A federal criminal law first must be interpreted
and then tested for constitutional validity. A federal procedure must square
with the constitutional rights found in the Bill of Rights. Federal procedure,
for the most part, is constitutional procedure; of the twenty-three individual
rights identified in the first eight amendments, twelve concern criminal
procedure. Federalism makes matters more complicated when a state
criminal conviction is being challenged in a collateral preceding in the
nature of habeas corpus in federal court. 195 A state substantive law must
be interpreted in federal court in the same way a state court would interpret
it, but then the federal constitutional overlay must be applied. 196 A state
has no police power to violate the Constitution of the United States. State
procedures, likewise, must afford at least the minimum federal procedural
due process found in the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated liberties. 197
The Eleventh Circuit's decisions considered such perennial issues as
interpretation offederal criminal statutes, self-incrimination, right to counsel,
speedy trial, jury, due process, double jeopardy, and the right to appeal.
Issues about death penalty procedures and procedures on federal habeas
corpus review also were much in evidence and proved particularly
difficult. 198
The Eleventh Circuit functioned as a common law court to interpret the
Federal Bank Robbery ACt. 199 In United States v. Bell/oo a three-judge
194. See generally Deborah S. Braden, Eleventh Circuit, Fourth Amendment Seizure:
The Fifth Circuit Adopts a Restrictive Definition, 13 CUMBo L. REv. 79 (1982); Mark T.
Davis, Eleventh Circuit, Drug Paraphernalia Laws: Clearing a Legal Haze, 13 CUMBo L.
REv. 273 (1982); W. Dennis McKinnie, Eleventh Circuit, Use ofElectronic TrackingDevices
in the Fifth Circuit: Trailing the New Approach, 13 CUMBo L. REv. 51 (1982).
195. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1988).
196. See Michigan V. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
197. See Moore V. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 541-52 (1977) (White, 1.,
dissenting).
198. See generally Charles Graddick, Debunking the Ancient Writ: A Critical Analysis
of the Law of Habeas Corpus, 14 CUMBo L. REv. 1 (1984); Michael Mello & Ruthann
Robson, Judge Over Jury: Florida's Practice ofImposing Death Over Life in Capital Cases,
13 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 31 (1985); Barbara A. Ward, Competencyfor Execution: Problems
in Law and Psychiatry, 14 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 35 (1986); Valerie Shea, Comment, Eleventh
Circuit Rejects Claim ofFlorida Death Row Inmates: Ford V. Strickland, 7 NOVA LJ. 415
(1983).
199. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(b) (1988).
200. 649 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. Unit B Mar. 1981) (Tjoflat, J., for Godbold, J.; Vance, J.,
dissenting).
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panel had reversed, but a divided en banc court affinned the conviction.201
A Supreme Court majority settled the issue (on which the circuits had
divided much like the en banc court had) and ruled that the statute was not
limited to common law larceny but also included the defendant's crime of
obtaining money under false pretenses.202
The Supreme Court resolved another circuit conflict in Garcia v.
United States,203 and again sided with the Eleventh Circuit's approach,204
to hold that the statute proscribing assault and robbery of any custodian of
"mail matter or of any money or other property" of the United States20S
covered "flash money" being used by an undercover secret service agent to
buy counterfeit currency. A third decision involved an interpretive issue
under the Hobbs Act,206 about which the circuits were in conflict. Again,
the Supreme Court agreed with the Eleventh Circuif07 and concluded that
the affinnative act of inducement by a public official was not a necessary
element of the offense of extortion under color of official right in a case
styled Evans v. United States.208
Few Supreme Court decisions have had as much sustained controversy
to them as has Miranda v. Arizona.209 One testament to the complexity
of that doctrine is that nearly thirty years later there are still difficult issues
and applications which continue to divide the courts of appeals and the
Supreme Court. Wainwright v. Greenfielcflo is one example. The
majority affinned the Eleventh Circuit decision211 that the use of a
defendant's post-arrest, post-Miranda warnings silence as evidence of his
sanity violated due process.
The right to counsel is recognized as being central to the adversarial
system ofjustice. First decade decisions touched on three critical questions.
201. United States v. Bell, 678 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982) (en bane) (opinions filed
by Vance, Anderson, & Tjoflat, 11.).
202. Bell v. United States, 462 U.S. 356 (1983).
203. 469 U.S. 70 (1984).
204. United States v. Garcia, 718 F.2d 1528 (11th Cir. 1983) (Atkins, J., for Fay &
Kraviteh, 11.).
205. 18 U.S.C. § 2114 (1988).
206. [d. § 1951 (1988).
207. United States v. Evans, 910 F.2d 790 (11th Cir. 1990) (Kraviteh, J. for Cox &
Dyer, 11.).
208. 112 S. Ct 1881 (1992).
209. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
210. 474 U.S. 284 (1986).
211. Greenfield v. Wainwright, 741 F.2d 329 (11th Cir. 1984) (Tjoflat, J., for Godbold
& Henderson, 11.).
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In Wainwright v. Torna,212 the Supreme Court reversed the court of
appeals213 and held that since the petitioner had no constitutional right to
counsel to pursue a discretionary review in the state supreme court, he was
not deprived of effective assistance of counsel as a result of his retained
counsel's failure to timely file the application for review.214
The Supreme Court granted review of a fractured en banc decision215
and announced the proper standard for the effective assistance of counsel in
Strickland v. Washington. 216 The Sixth Amendment/Due Process right to
counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel, and the benchmark
for judging any allegation of ineffectiveness must be whether, considering
all the circumstances, the defense attorney's conduct so undermined the
proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied
on to have produced a just result. The defendant, in order to raise a
successful challenge, must show that there is a reasonable probability that
the result of the proceeding would have been different, but for the defense
counsel's unprofessional errors.217
Reversals under a reasonableness standard reflect the reviewing court's
perception of the average defense attorney, and from the run of decisions
rejecting right to counsel claims, the members of the federal bench seem to
have a rather low opinion of the average criminal defense attorney.218 In
Burger v. Kemp,219 for example, the Supreme Court held that the defense
attorney's professional partnership with the attorney representing his client's
codefendant in a separate prosecution did not so infect the attorney's
representation as to constitute active representation of a competing interest.
The Court upheld the Eleventh Circuit's outcome220 and went on to
conclude that there was some reasonable basis for the defense attorney's
212. 455 U.S. 586 (1982).
213. 649 F.2d 290 (5th Cir. Unit B June 1981) (per curiam) (Miller, Johnson, & Clark,
JJ.).
214. Torna, 455 U.S. at 586.
215. 693 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982) (opinions filed by Vance, Tjoflat, Clark,
Johnson, Roney, & Hill, JJ.).
216. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
217. !d. at 694.
218. See Thomas E. Baker, Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 34 MERCER L. REv.
1241, 1271 (1983).
219. 483 U.S. 776 (1987).
220. Burger v. Kemp, 785 F.2d 890 (11 th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (Vance & Allgood,
JJ.; Johnson, J., dissenting).
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failure to develop and present evidence of the defendant's troubled family
background at the penalty stage of his capital prosecution.221
In a 1990 decision, Doggett v. United States,222 the Supreme Court
agreed with the Eleventh Circuit's summary of the proper analysis for a
speedy trial claim,223 but disagreed with the intermediate court's applica-
tion ofthe rules to the facts. In a relatively rare holding, the Supreme Court
concluded that the defendant was denied his Sixth Amendment right to a
speedy trial by the eight-and-one-half year delay between his indictment and
his arrest.224
The central right to a competent and unimpaired jury was involved in
Tanner v. United States.22S Responding to the defendants' aIIegations and
offers of proof, the Supreme Court affirmed the Eleventh Circuif26 and
held that an evidentiary hearing was barred under Federal Rule of Evidence
606(b)'s general prohibition of juror impeachment.227 The Court also
concluded that no hearing was necessary to resolve the particular aIIegations
of juror abuse of alcohol and drugs since there were sufficient other bases
to reject the claims. The right to an impartial jury composed ofjurors who
are competent and unimpaired could be adequately protected by other trial
procedures, such as voir dire, in-court observations by counsel, court, and
other trial participants, and by the procedure, aIIowed by the trial court here,
to conduct a post-trial evidentiary hearing to impeach the verdict by non-
juror evidence of the aIIeged misconduct.
The Due Process Clause protects an accused against a conviction except
upon proof beyond and to the exclusion of every reasonable doubt. The
Supreme Court was caIIed on to apply settled rules about burden-shifting
inferences and presumptions in jury instructions in Francis v. Franklin.228
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the trial judge's instruction to the jury
had impermissibly shifted the burden of proof on the issue of intent and that
221. Burger, 483 U.S. at 776.
222. 112 S. Ct 2686 (1992).
223. United States v. Doggett, 906 F.2d 573 (11th Cir. 1990) (Kravitch, 1., for Atkins,
J.; Clark, 1., dissenting).
224. Doggett, 112 S. Ct at 2686.
225. 483 U.S. 107 (1987).
226. United States v. Conover, 772 F.2d 765 (11th Cir. 1985) (Garza, J., for Hill &
Anderson, JJ.).
227. Tanner, 483 U.S. at 107.
228. 471 U.S. 307 (1985).
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the error was not harmless.229 The Supreme Court majority agreed that
there was reversible error in the charge.230
Double jeopardy complications arose in Garrett v. United States.231
The defendant was convicted of a continuing criminal enterprise, conspiracy
to possess marijuana with intent to distribute, and using a telephone to
facilitate illegal drug activities. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the convic-
tion.232 The Supreme Court looked first to the intent of Congress and then
to the limits of the Fifth Amendment to hold: 1) Congress intended that the
continuing criminal enterprise offense be a separate offense and authorized
prosecution for both the predicate offense and the enterprise offense; 2) the
prosecution for the continuing criminal enterprise offense after the earlier
prosecution for marijuana importation did not offend principles of double
jeopardy; 3) the Fifth Amendment did not bar cumulative punishments for
the enterprise offense and the underlying predicate importation offense.233
The right to appeal was the subject of Wasman v. United States. 234
Following an appellate reversal of his earlier conviction, the defendant was
retried and again convicted. The Supreme Court affirmed the Eleventh
Circuit's second handling of the case235 and held that after retrial and
reconviction, following a successful appeal, a trial court may justify an
increased sentence by affirmatively identifying relevant conduct or events
that occurred after the first sentencing. Any presumption of vindictiveness
was rebutted by the trial judge's careful explanation that the second sentence
was greater because of an intervening conviction; therefore, the longer
second sentence was manifestly legitimate.
Every judge on the Eleventh Circuit will admit that the most difficult
of all appeals, in terms of their toll on the judicial psyche, are death penalty
appeals. The facts are difficult. The law is difficult. Additionally, these
difficulties are made worse by the weight of responsibility for the outcome.
229. Franklin v. Francis, 720 F.2d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir. 1983) (Tjoflat, 1., for Hill &
Simpson, JJ.).
230. Francis, 471 U.S. at 326; see also Burger, 483 U.S. at 781-83 (holding a similar
claim of error harmless).
231. 471 U.S. 773 (1985).
232. United States v. Garrett, 727 F.2d 1003 (11th Cir. 1984) (Kravitch, 1., for Fay &
Atkins, JJ.); see also Sandra Bower Ross, Comment, The Pattern Element ofRICO Before
and After Sedima: A Look at Both Federal and Florida RICO, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 321
(1987).
233. Garrett, 471 U.S. at 773.
234. 468 U.S. 559 (1984).
235. United States v. Wasman, 700 F.2d 663 (11th Cir. 1983) (Markey, 1., for Fay &
Clark, JJ.).
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McCleskey v. Kemp,236 a 1987 decision, was understood at the time
to represent the last, best challenge against the death penalty. The case was
reviewed en banc in the Eleventh Circuit on the issue of whether proof of
disparate racial impact could be the basis for a holding that a state's death
penalty was unconstitutional. The en banc judges debated among them-
selves in lengthy opinions, but the majority concluded that the statistical
showing had not been sufficient.237 An African-American defendant was
convicted in a Georgia trial court of armed robbery and the murder of a
white police officer. He was tried and sentenced under state procedures
which the Supreme Court had upheld in 1976.238 To support his claim in
federal court, the defendant-petitioner proffered a statistical study (the
Baldus study) that purported to show a disparity in the imposition of the
death sentence in Georgia based on the murder victim's race and, to a lesser
extent, on the defendant's race. The exhaustive and comprehensive study
of all the murder prosecutions in the state revealed that African-American
defendants whose victims were white have a statistically significant greater
likelihood of receiving the death penalty. The Supreme Court of the United
States, by a five to four vote, rejected this argument under the incorporated
Eighth Amendment and under the Equal Protection Clause ofthe Fourteenth
Amendment.239
The second substantive death penalty holding came down in Ford v.
Wainwright.240 The Supreme Court majority reversed and remanded the
Eleventh Circuit panel decision,241 The High Court interpreted the Eighth
Amendment to prohibit a state from inflicting the penalty of death upon a
prisoner who is insane. The Court held that state procedures for determin-
ing the sanity of the death row inmate were not adequate to assure a full and
fair hearing on the critical issue, and therefore the petitioner was entitled to
an evidentiary hearing on the question in the collateral federal trial court.242
236. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
237. McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (opinions filed by
nine judges: Roney, Tjoflat, Kravitch, Vance, Anderson, Godbold, Johnson, Hatchett, &
Clark, 11.).
238. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, stay granted, 429 U.S. 1301, and vacated, 429
U.S. 875 (1976).
239. McCleskey,481 U.S. at 308-13.
240. 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
241. Ford v. Wainwright, 752 F.2d 526 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (Vance &
Stafford, 11.; Clark, 1., dissenting).
242. Ford, 477 U.S. at 418.
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Jury selection in death cases must be sensitive to the constitutional
interests of both the accused and the state.243 The Supreme Court used the
case of Wainwright v. Witf44 to caution courts of appeals about their
proper role when reviewing the factual issue of whether a prospective juror
was sufficiently biased as to be excludable. The Eleventh Circuif45 erred,
according to the Supreme Court, in the panel's willingness to second guess
the district court's assessment of what had happened in the state trial court.
In Darden v. Wainwright,246 the en banc court in the Eleventh Circuit
ruled in favor of the state prisoner.247 The Supreme Court subsequently
vacated and remanded the Eleventh Circuit decision based on Wainwright
v. Witt.248 However, on remand, the en banc court denied relief.249 The
second time the case came before the Supreme Court, the majority
definitively held that under the circumstances the particular juror had been
properly excluded for indicating that he had moral, religious, or conscien-
tious principles in opposition to the death penalty that were so strong that
he would be unable to recommend a death penalty regardless of the
evidence.25o
Procedures and events at the penalty phase of capital prosecutions
routinely serve as the focus of later federal habeas corpus challenges. In
Wainwright v. Goode/51 the Supreme Court ruled that the Eleventh
Circuif52 erred in substituting its own view for the view of the state
supreme court on the issue of whether the state trial court relied on an
impermissive aggravating factor.2S3 The majority went on to opine that,
even if the state trial judge relied on the problematic factor, the state trial
did not produce a sentence so arbitrary as to violate the Constitution. In
Hitchcock v. Dugger,254 the Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit,
243. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
244. 469 U.S. 412 (1985).
245. Witt v. Wainwright, 714 F.2d 1069 (11th Cir. 1983) (Tuttle, J., for Kravitch, J.;
Roney, J., specially concurring).
246. 477 U.S. 168 (1986).
247. Darden v. Wainwright, 725 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1984) (en bane) (opinions filed
by Johnson, Tjoflat, Hill, & Fay, JJ.).
248. Wainright v. Darden, 469 U.S. 1202 (1985).
249. Darden v. Wainwright, 767 F.2d 752 (11th Cir. 1985) (en bane).
250. Darden, 477 U.S. at 178.
251. 464 U.S. 78 (1983).
252. Goode v. Wainwright, 704 F.2d 593 (11th Cir. 1983) (Anderson, 1., for Godbold
& Hoffman, JJ.).
253. See Goode, 464 U.S. at 83-84.
254. 481 U.S. 393 (1987).
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sitting en banc,255 and held that the advisory jury in the state trial court
had been unconstitutionally "instructed not to consider, and the sentencing
judge [had improperly] refused to consider, evidence of nonstatutory
mitigating circumstances ...." that should have been considered.256 In
Parker v. Dugger,257 the Supreme Court held that the state supreme court
had incorrectly determined that the state trial had found no mitigating
circumstances in pronouncing sentence and, consequently, had failed to
follow constitutional procedures required for weighing aggravating and
mitigating factors.2S8
The surveyed decisions of the Eleventh Circuit also provide a window
on the arcane and convoluted procedures in federal habeas corpus proceed-
ings. The procedural rules in these actions are more easily stated than
applied, as the Eleventh Circuit learned in two decisions. In Amadeo v.
Zant,259 the Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuif60 and deter-
mined that the district court's finding that the petitioner had established
cause for his state court procedural default was not clearly erroneous and
should have been affirmed under settled principles. On the other hand, in
Dugger v. Adams,261 the Supreme Court did not find cause excusing the
petitioner's default under the relevant case law and reversed the Eleventh
Circuit.262
The most important first decade habeas holding came in McCleskey v.
Zant.263 It involved the issue of abuse of the writ, an issue that in death
penalty cases can make the difference between a last minute stay or
execution.264 Again, the Supreme Court used an Eleventh Circuit deci-
sion265 as a vehicle for national lawmaking. The majority held that when
a state prisoner files a second or subsequent petition the state bears the
255. Hitchcock v. Wainwright, 770 F.2d 1514 (11th Cir. 1985)(en banc)(Roney, 1., for
the majority; Johnson 1., dissenting).
256. Hitchcock, 481 U.S. at 398-99.
257. 498 U.S. 308 (1991).
258. Id. at 320-22.
259. 486 U.S. 214 (1988).
260. Amadeo v. Kemp, 816 F.2d 1502 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (Vance &
Henderson, JJ.; Clark, J., dissenting).
261. 489 U.S. 401 (1989).
262. Adams v. Wainwright, 804 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1986) (Johnson, J., for Roney &
Fay, JJ.).
263. 499 U.S. 467 (1991).
264. See Antone v. Dugger, 465 U.S. 200 (1984).
265. McCleskey v. Zant, 890 F.2d 342 (11 th Cir. 1989) (Kravitch, J., for Edmondson
& Roney, JJ.), affd 499 U.S. 467 (1991).
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burden of pleading abuse of the writ; the burden is satisfied if the state
describes prior petitions and identifies the issue raised for the first time; then
the procedural burden shifts to the petitioner to show cause and actual
prejudice or, alternatively, a fundamental miscarriage of justice. With this
elaboration, the Supreme Court effectively narrowed the possibility that a
state prisoner could succeed on any petition that followed the first federal
collateral review.
Collectively, these criminal law and criminal procedure decisions
demonstrate that the Eleventh Circuit has taken its place alongside the other
United States Courts of Appeals. It is one of the main pipelines of these
cases to the Supreme Court, but the influence flows in both directions. The
court of appeals is directed toward the responsibility of correcting errors in
the nine district courts under its supervision.266 But it has a national
orientation at the same time. In Alabama, Georgia, and Florida, the
Eleventh Circuit is the judicial institution that has the primary federalizing
responsibility for implementing the national policy on crime and, at the
same time, for guaranteeing the promise of the Bill of Rights to citizens
accused of crime.
What is most evident, perhaps, in the death penalty and habeas corpus
decisions, is the constitutional abstraction of federalism. The three
sovereign states in the Eleventh Circuit have made the criminal justice
policy decision to rely on the death penalty. Consequently, the Eleventh
Circuit has the macabre responsibility of being something of a death court,
or more accurately, a constitutional court in these capital cases. According
to one expert, of the forty-three habeas death penalty cases decided by the
Supreme Court during the period being studied, nearly half of them
originated in the Eleventh Circuit.267 Many of these, as demonstrated
above, have had national significance for this area of criminal law and
constitutional procedure. It is safe to predict that the incorporated Eighth
Amendment will continue to demand the attention of the Eleventh Circuit
bench for the foreseeable future.268
Finally, it should be noted that the court of appeals' frequent reliance
on the en banc mechanism to deal with these issues suggests a prudent
exercise of collegial decision-making. These full-court efforts help assure
266. 28 U.S.c. § 133 (1988).
267. Godbold, supra note 10, at 976; see also Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797
(1982) (holding that application of the death penalty to a defendant who was not a principal,
but only an aider and abetter, was unconstitutional).
268. See generally Timothy W. Floyd, Criminal Procedure, 22 TEx. TECH L. REv. 493
(1991 ).
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that the law of the circuit will be unifonn and will express the judicial
philosophy of the majority of the circuit judges. Through en bane hearings
past panels are rehabilitated and future panels are infonned. Even more
important, the Supreme Court benefits from the fuller and more diverse
expressions of judicial views contained in the multiple opinions that issue
from full-court review.
IX. EVIDENCE LAW
The Federal Rules of Evidence have, as their express objective, "to
secure fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and
delay, and promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence to
the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly deter-
mined."269 On three occasions, the Supreme Court used Eleventh Circuit
appeals as a vehicle to address the law of evidence.
In Amadeo v. Zant,z70 a state prisoner was convicted of murder and
sentenced to death. He was in federal court on a collateral challenge based
on alleged equal protection violations in the selection of his petit jury.271
The issue before the Supreme Court dealt with the relationship between a
district court and a court of appeals when reviewing findings of fact.272
On the record, the Supreme Court concluded that the factual findings upon
which the district court had based its conclusion-that the petitioner had
established cause for his procedural default of not objecting to the jury
selection at the state criminal trial-were not clearly erroneous; therefore,
the court of appeals should not have set aside the district court's grant of
relief. If there are two pennissible views of the same evidence, the view of
the trier' of fact cannot be deemed clearly erroneous. The appellate court
cannot engage in fact-finding.
The Supreme Court gave the district judge a lesson in evidence law in
Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey.273 The spouses of deceased Navy pilots
brought an action against the aircraft manufacturer and the service company.
The district court entered a judgment on a jury verdict in favor of the
defendants and the Eleventh Circuit reversed after a rehearing en banc.274
Having detennined that a Navy investigative report was sufficiently
269. FED. R. EVID. 102.
270. 486 U.S. 214 (1988).
271. See supra text accompanying notes 259-61.
272. See FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a).
273. 488 U.S. 153 (1988).
274. Rainey v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 827 F.2d 1498 (11th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (per
curiam) (Tjoflat & Johnson, JI., specially concurring).
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trustworthy to be admissible, the district court also admitted, over plaintiffs'
objections, most of the report's "opinions," including a statement suggesting
that pilot error was most probably the cause of the crash. The Supreme
Court affirmed the district court's admission of these "opinions," under
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8)(C), and agreed that the material was not
excludable as hearsay.275 Factually based conclusions or opinions are not
excludable, according to the Court's interpretation of the rule and the
Advisory Committee Notes, when they appear in a public record or report,
so long as the record or report otherwise satisfies the trustworthiness
criterion making it admissible in the first place.
In a rather rare alternative holding, the Supreme Court held that the
district court had abused its discretion in restricting the scope of cross-
examination of a witness.276 However, the Court remanded for further
proceedings consistent with Federal Rule of Evidence 106. The witness, a
Navy flight instructor, had testified on direct examination as an adverse
witness that he had made certain statements, arguably supporting the theory
of pilot error, in a detailed letter in which he also took issue with some of
the other findings in the previously mentioned report. The Supreme Court
held that he should have been permitted to testify on cross-examination that
his letter also included statements that he believed that the crash was due to
power failure, so that the jury would be presented with a complete account
of his letter.277 The Supreme Court reasoned that when one party has
made use of a portion of a document and a distortion or misunderstanding
can only be averted through the presentation of another portion of the
document, the additional material required to be presented for the sake of
completeness is ipso facto relevant and admissible.278
Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) codifies the long-accepted common
law rule, which the federal courts have always followed, that a jury verdict
cannot be impeached with ajuror's testimony as "to the effect of anything
upon [his] or any other juror's mind or emotions ... except that ... [such
testimony is admissible on the question of] whether any outside influence
was improperly brought to bear upon any juror.,,279 In Tanner v. United
275. Rainey, 488 U.S. at 153. See generally Joel R. Brown, Comment, The Confronta-
tion Clause and the Hearsay Rule: A Problematic Relationship in Need of a Practical
Analysis, 14 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 949 (1987).
276. Rainey, 488 U.S. at 153.
277. ld.
278. See FED. R. EVID. 401, 402.
279. ld. 606(b).
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States/SO the Supreme Court affirmed an Eleventh Circuit decision2s1
that allegations of substance abuse by the jurors did not fall within the
exception and, therefore, an evidentiary hearing was not required. This
result was dictated by the text of the rule, the legislative history, and the
strong public policy of ensuring full and free deliberations, in order to
protect jurors from harassment by the losing party, and to preserve the
community's trust in the jury system. As if to cover all bases, the majority
went on, in dicta, to say that affidavits and testimony noting that jurors had
consumed alcoholic beverages at lunch and that several had fallen asleep in
the afternoon did not form an adequate basis for placing any mistrust on the
jury verdict.
These evidence law decisions highlight several important themes.282
The law of evidence is the domain of trial lawyers and trial judges: those
who apply it and make it. The law in this area is rule-based, but the
Federal Rules of Evidence are codifications and restatements of common
law principles. Therefore, the rules are best understood against that
background of understanding. Finally, the Eleventh Circuit seems to be
respectful of the district court's role in the court system. The trial is
supposed to be the main drama, while the appeal is merely the critic's
review. It is at the trial where the adversarial processes work to approxi-
mate truth. The main role of the appellate court is to help insure that the
trial proceeds in a fair and efficient manner as an asymptote of what
happened and who did what to whom and why.283
X. LABOR LAW
The history of labor law in the United States contains more social
history and class conflict than legal theory. The legal response to the labor
280. 483 U.S. 107 (1987).
281. United States v. Conover, 772 F.2d 765 (11th Cir. 1985) (Garza, J., for Anderson,
J.; Hill, J., specially concurring); see also supra text accompanying notes 217-19.
282. See generally Robert S. Catz & Jill J. Lange, Judicial Privilege, 22 GA. L. REv.
89 (1987); Kenneth J. MeUIli, Exclusion ofEvidence in Federal Prosecutions on the Basis
of State Law, 22 GA. L. REv. 667 (1988); William A. Schroeder, Evidentiary Use in
Criminal Cases of Collateral Crimes and Acts: A Comparison of the Federal Rules and
Alabama Law, 35 ALA. L. REv. 241 (1984); Michael D. Ennert, Comment, Mental Disorder
in Witnesses: An Overview of Competency and Credibility Issues, 41 ALA. L. REv. 167
(1989).
283. Compare Paul D. Carrington, The Power ofDistrictJudges and the Responsibility
of Courts ofAppeals, 3 GA. L. REv. 507 (1969) with Charles A. Wright, The Doubtful
Omniscience ofAppellate Courts, 41 MINN. L. REv. 751 (1957).
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movement and the opposing movement against labor organization has
largely been statutory. The primary developments have occurred in the halls
of Congress, not in federal courtrooms. Nevertheless, the federal courts
have had the important responsibilities of interpreting and applying the
edicts of the legislative branch. The first legislative goal is to ensure
"industrial peace" among the employers, the labor organizations and the
individual employees.284 In more recent years, Congress has constructed
an elaborate statutory framework for protecting the rights of workers from
a host of marketplace discriminations. The federal courts, including the
courts of appeals, provide a forum for keeping the labor peace and for
policing the labor place.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Eleventh Circuit's28S decision in
Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida GulfCoast Building & Construction
Trades Council.286 The National Labor Relations Board287 (''NLRB'')
issued an order instructing the union to stop distributing handbills, at a
construction site, which urged mall customers not to shop at any of the
mall's stores until the mall owner guaranteed that the building contractors
would pay fair wages. The Supreme Court first held that the NLRB
interpretation of the National Labor Relations Acf88 (''NLRA'') was not
entitled to judicial deference, particularly when the NLRB interpretation
would raise serious First Amendment problems.289 Instead, the Court
rejected the argument that the union's peaceful distribution of handbills at
the mall entrances violated the NLRA provision, making it an unfair labor
practice to "threaten, coerce, or restrain any person" to cease doing business
284. See ROBERT A. GORMAN, BASIC TExT ON LABOR LAW, UNIONIZATION, AND
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING I (1976); see also Sarah L. Manning, Eleventh Circuit, Wright
Line: The Burden ofProofin Dual Motive Cases Under Section 8(A)(3), 13 CUMBo L. REv.
239 (1982) (discussing Wright Line, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1980), enforced, 662 F.2d 899
(1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982»; David J. Middlebrooks, Comment,
Nonmajority Bargaining Orders: Predicting the Eleventh Circuit's Vote, 34 ALA. L. REv.
85 (1983).
285. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. NLRB, 796 F.2d 1328 (11th
Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (Hill, Anderson, & Tuttle, JJ.).
286. 485 U.S. 568 (1988).
287. See generally Patricia Diaz Dennis, Principles That Guide My Decisionmaking, 15
STETSON L. REv. 5 (1985) (the author is a member of the NLRB).
288. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1988).
289. See Hudgens V. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
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with another.290 Such handbilling and appeals to consumers did not fall
within the scope of the congressional meaning and intent.
The Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuif91 in Hechler v.
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 759?92 The case
required the High Court to interpret and apply the Labor Management
Relations Act of 1947293 ("LMRA"). An electrical apprentice brought suit
against her union, alleging that the union had breached its duty to ascertain
that she possessed essential training and skill before being assigned to
perform a job at which she was injured. After the lawsuit was removed, the
district court dismissed it for failure to comply with the federal statute of
limitations. The Eleventh Circuit ruled in favor ofthe employee. However,
the Supreme Court disagreed and held that the claim fell within the preemp-
tive effect of section 301 of the LMRA. This conclusion was reinforced by
the policy behind the statute to provide a uniform meaning to contract terms
in collective bargaining agreements, since the lawsuit depended on the
meaning to be given to the relevant agreement between the parties.
Therefore, the federal, and not the state, limitations period applied.
Accordingly, the only question left on remand was whether the claim was
based on the union's duty of fair representation, in which case the brief
federal six-month period applied, or whether the claim amounted to a third-
party beneficiary suit based on the collective bargaining agreement, in which
case a longer federal statute of limitations period would apply.
In a very important decision to the region's migrant workers, the
Supreme Court affirmed the Eleventh Circuit,294 holding that exclusivity
provisions in state workers' compensation law~ do not bar migrant workers
from bringing private actions under the Federal Migrant and Seasonal
Agricultural Worker Protection Act.295 The decision in Adams Fruit Co.
v. Barretf96 relied on the actual language of the federal statute and
depended on the Congressional history of the measure in analyzing
preemption.
290. Florida Gulf Coast, 485 U.S. at 578 (interpreting 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B)
(1988)).
291. Hechler v. International Bhd. ofElec. Workers Local 759, 772 F.2d 788 (11th Cir.
1985) (Clark, J., for Henderson & Tuttle, JJ.).
292. 481 U.S. 851 (1987).
293. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-188 (1988).
294. Barrett v. Adams Fruit Co., 867 F.2d 1305 (11th Cir. 1989) (Vance, J., for
Kravitch & Henderson, JJ.).
295. Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638 (1990) (interpreting 29 U.S.C. §§ 1801-
1872 (1988)).
296. Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 145-47.
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The Supreme Court was called on to interpret and apply the Federal
Service Labor Management Relations Statute297 in Fort Stewart Schools
v. Federal Labor Relations Authority.298 The Federal Labor Relations
Authority ("FLRA") had ruled that the Army was required to negotiate with
a union representing employees of two elementary schools located in the
Fort. The Supreme Court agreed with the Eleventh Circuif99 that the
FLRA should be upheld. The union's proposals, relating to mileage
reimbursements, various types of paid leave, and salary increases, fell within
the statute's coverage of "conditions of employment," at least in the
interpretation of the FLRA.300 The Supreme Court found no reason to
reject the agency's interpretation.
What was probably the most important Supreme Court labor law
decision to come out of the Eleventh Circuit in its first decade was Hishon
v. King & Spalding.30l A female attorney sued one of the oldest and most
prestigious law firms in the circuit. She alleged that the firm's decision not
to promote her from associate to partner constituted sex-based discrimination
under Title VII of the CiviJ Rights Act of 1964.302 A divided panel of the
Eleventh Circuit held that the Act did not apply to such partnership
decision-making.303 The Supreme Court reversed and ruled that the
plaintiff had stated a cognizable claim and was entitled to her day in court.
Partnership consideration was part and parcel of the employment relation-
ship, even though making partner was not automatic or guaranteed.
Partnership consideration could not be based on any ofthe factors prohibited
by Title VII: race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Application of
the Civil Rights Act did not infringe on the firm or members' constitutional
rights of expression or free association.304
297. 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7135 (1988).
298. 495 U.S. 641 (1990).
299. Fort Stewart Schs. v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 860 F.2d 396 (11 th Cir. 1988)
(Hatchett, J., for Vance & Nesbitt, JJ.).
300. See Fort Stewart Schs., 495 U.S. at 644-50.
301. 467 U.S. 69 (1984); see also Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (lith Cir.
1982) (employing sexual harassment analysis relied on by Supreme Court in Meritor Savings
Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986)).
302. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988 & Supp. III 1991). See generally Andrea Zelman,
Comment, Civil Rights: Law Partners as Employees/or Title VII Purposes, 35 U. FLA. L.
REv. 201 (1983).
303. Hischon v. King & Spalding, 678 F.2d 1022, 1030 (11th Cir. 1982) (Fay, 1., for
Young, J.; Tjoflat, J., dissenting).
304. Hischon, 467 U.S. at 73-79; see also Martha E. Waters, Recent Decision, Title VII:
Relieffor Sexual Harassment in the Eleventh Circuit, 35 ALA. L. REv. 193 (1984).
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The Supreme Court had occasion to reverse another Eleventh Circuit
holding,30S under Title VII, in Florida v. Long.306 State employees
brought a class action alleging that the State of Florida's pension plan
system for state employees discriminated on the basis of sex. Specifically,
the Supreme Court was asked to decide the date upon which pension funds
covered by Title VII were required to offer benefit structures that did not
discriminate on the basis of sex, and whether persons who, in fact, retired
before that date were entitled to adjusted benefits to eliminate any sex
discrimination for all future benefits. This called for an interpretation of the
statute and some reconciliation of earlier decisions.307 Choosing the date
of the later of its two decisions, the majority reasoned that the Court's first
decision, which invalidated discriminatory pension plan contributions, did
not put the state on notice that its optional pension plan, that offered sex-
based benefits, was in violation ofthe federal law. Therefore, liability could
not be imposed for Florida's conduct before the second Supreme Court
decision that explicitly prohibit~d such discriminatory benefits. Further-
more, the legislative purposes behind Title VII would not be advanced by
an inequitable award of retroactive damages against the states and local
governments.
The last mentioned labor law decision to arise in the Eleventh Circuit
was School Board ofNassau County v. Arline.308 This case dealt with the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973.309 A school teacher, who alleged that she was
fired from her job solely for the reason that she had a history and suscepti-
bility to tuberculosis, argued that the statute protected her as a "handicapped
individual" who was "otherwise qualified to teach . . . .'>310 The Eleventh
Circuit held that the contagious disease constituted a statutory handicap.311
The Supreme Court affirmed and held that the statute prohibited the school
system, as a federally funded state program, from discriminating against her
solely by reason of her handicap. The case was remanded for further
305. Long v. Florida, 805 F.2d }542 (11th Cir. 1986) (Godbold, J., for Fay & Atkins,
JJ.).
306. 487 U.S. 223 (1988).
307. See Arizona Governing Cornrn. for Tax Deferred Annuity & Deferred Compensa-
tion Plans v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073 (1983); Los Angeles, Dep't of Water & Power v.
Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
308. 480 U.S. 273 (1987) (interpreting 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1983)).
309. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1988).
310. Arline, 480 U.S. at 275.
311. Arline v. School Bd. of Nassau County, 772 F.2d 759,764 (11th Cir. 1985)
(Vance, J., for Anderson & Henley, JJ.).
HeinOnline -- 19 Nova L. Rev. 368 1994-1995
368 Nova Law Review Vol. 19
proceedings to determine whether the teacher, in fact, was otherwise
qualified to teach, and therefore, fired improperly.
These labor law decisions demonstrate the essential "federalness" of
employment law, once the issues go beyond traditional state contract law
and workers' compensation statutes. Federal law is based on statute. The
limited role of the judicial branch, consequently, is to divine the legislative
intent and be true to the Congressional scheme. The flow of influence goes
both ways: national policies are implemented in the local community
through federal court enforcement and the Eleventh Circuit produces the
case vehicles for deciding issues with nationally binding effects.
x. TAXATION
It has been said that "[t]he technical laws Congress has devised tend to
make the comprehension of the income tax system all too absorbing in time
and energy.,,312 Mercifully for the author, the Eleventh Circuit has not
developed a reputation as a leading tax court. Only two decisions during
the first decade had to do with tax law and neither is absorbing.
In the first tax decision, Holywell Corp. v. Smith,313 a bankruptcy
trustee, who had been appointed under a confirmed plan to liquidate and
distribute the debtors' property after the property was transferred to a trust
created by the plan, sought a declaratory judgment on the question of the
trustee's obligation to file income tax returns and to pay taxes upon the gain
realized from the sale of real estate.3J4 The plan was silent on this issue.
The Bankruptcy Court decided that the trustee did not have to file or pay
and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.3IS The Supreme Court, however,
disagreed. Since the trustee was an assignee of all or substantially all of the
property of the corporate debtors, the trustee would have to file returns and
pay taxes as if there had been no plan. As a fiduciary, the trustee had to
file returns and pay the taxes due on income attributable to the individual
debtor's property. The unanimous Court held that the United States' earlier
failure to object to the plan, which was silent about taxes, did not preclude
the government from seeking payment of taxes from the trustee?J6
312. MICHAEL D. ROSE & JOHN C. CHOMMIE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXAnON I (3d ed.
1988).
313. 112 S. Ct. 1021 (1992).
314. See II U.S.C. § 1141(a) (1988); 26 U.S.C. § 6012(b)(3)-(4) (1988).
315. In re Holywell Corp., 911 F.2d 1539 (11th Cir. 1990)(Hatchett, J., for Henderson,
J.; Cox, J., dissenting).
316. Holywell, 112 S. Ct. at 1021.
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The only other tax case was Dickman v. Commissioner.317 The
Eleventh Circuit reversed a detennination by the United States Tax Court
which had concluded that intrafamily, interest-free demand loans did not
result in taxable gifts.318 The Supreme Court sided with the Commissioner
and detennined that the loans were taxable gifts of the reasonable value of
the use of the money being 10aned.319 This result resolved a conflict
among the circuits in favor of the approach the Eleventh Circuit had taken
on direct appeal. The issue was of obvious importance to the proper
functioning of the tax system.320
Two decisions do not constitute a sufficient sample to reach any
conclusion about the status of tax law in the Eleventh Circuit. Any
assessment is left for some future evaluation.
XII. CONCLUSION
It has been difficult even to attempt to account for ten years of
decisions in so many different areas of the law. It is even more difficult,
if not impossible, to summarize the overall significance of the Eleventh
Circuit's contributions to the law of the Nation. Nevertheless, even an
arbitrary selection process, as was used here, allows one to begin to
appreciate the responsibility of decision-making borne by the judges of the
intennediate federal court.
Federal judicial history was made with the creation ofthe United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. The judicial and legal history
made in turn by the Eleventh Circuit, during its first decade, has been true
to its judicial parent, the fonner Fifth Circuit, which aptly deserved the title
of a "great court.,,321 The priority of the first decade circuit judges was
"characterized by the goal of achieving stability as an institution."322
317. 465 U.S. 330 (1984).
318. Dickman v. Commissioner, 690 F.2d 812 (11th Cir. 1982) (Hill, 1., for Godbold,
1.; Fay, 1., concurring) (interpreting 26 U.S.C. § 2501 (1980».
319. Dickman, 465 U.S. at 337-38.
320. See David Vetter, Comment, Gift Taxation: Interest-Free Demand Loans-Gift or
EquivalentExchange?, 35 U. FLA. L. REv. 549 (1983); James L. Webster, Recent Decision,
Dickman v. Commissioner: The Supreme Court Applies the Gift Tax to Interest-Free Loans,
35 ALA. L. REv. 553 (1984). Congress has since addressed this issue. See 26 U.S.C. § 7872
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Obviously, by any account, that goal has been achieved. This newest of
regional courts of appeals has already struggled with many of the most
difficult issues of the day. It has sought to accommodate history and
precedent with the felt needs of the present.
This first decade of the Eleventh Circuit is merely its prologue. The
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has established its own identity, taken its
place alongside its twin, the new Fifth Circuit, and has found its own voice
among the other regional courts of appeals that comprise the intermediate
tier of the federal court system. It has performed thus far with a high-
minded purpose and in the best traditions of the Article III judiciary.
What, in the end, are the distinctive characteristics of the Eleventh
Circuit's jurisprudence? Perhaps the best conclusion is that it is too soon
to answer that question, after only one completed decade. Such a post-
diction must be attempted from the appropriate posture of intellectual
modesty and should be understood to be fraught with the same uncertainty
that characterizes predictions of the future. What the future will bring for
the Eleventh Circuit one can only wait and see. For example, before World
War II, who could have predicted what the civil rights cases would mean to
the old Fifth Circuit, and vice versa?
What can be said with great confidence is that the Eleventh Circuit will
continue ,to decide difficult and complex appeals in the best common law
tradition. The Supreme Court will continue to look to the Eleventh Circuit
for issues of national importance and for guidance on how they should be
decided. In this way, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit will continue to perform its assigned role of establishing precedent
and administeringjustice under the Constitution for the citizens living within
its boundary and for the rest of the Nation.323
323. Abram Chayes, How Does the Constitution Establish Justice?, 101 HARV. L. REv.
1026 (1988).
